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ARTICLE

TAXING THE GIG ECONOMY

KATHLEEN DELANEY THOMAS†
Due to advances in technology like mobile applications and online platforms,
millions of American workers now earn income through “gig” work, which allows
them the flexibility to set their own hours and choose which jobs to take. To the surprise
of many gig workers, the tax law considers them to be “business owners,” which
subjects them to onerous recordkeeping and filing requirements, along with the
obligation to pay quarterly estimated taxes. This Article proposes two reforms that
would drastically reduce tax compliance burdens for this new generation of small
business owners, while simultaneously enhancing the government’s ability to collect
tax revenue.
First, Congress should create a “non-employee withholding” regime that would
allow online platform companies such as Uber to withhold taxes for their workers
without being classified as employers. Second, this Article proposes a “standard
business deduction” for gig workers, which would eliminate the need to track and
report business expenses. Although this Article focuses on the gig economy as an
illustration of how the workplace has evolved in recent years, the proposals could apply
more broadly to taxation of small, individually run businesses. In an era when the use
of cash is on the decline and information can be shared rapidly at little cost, it is time
for policymakers to institute a more modern tax enforcement regime for small businesses.

† Assistant Professor of Law, UNC School of Law. I am grateful to Lily Batchelder, John Coyle,
Lilian Faulhaber, J. Clifton Fleming, Jacob Goldin, Itai Grinberg, Rachel Gurvich, Andrew Hayashi,
Daniel Hemel, Kristin Hickman, Michael Knoll, Omri Marian, Eric Muller, Shu-Yi Oei, Jason Oh,
Peter Reilly, Emily Satterthwaite, Richard Schmalbeck, Daniel Shaviro, Steven Sheffrin, Gladriel
Shobe, Keith Taylor and his colleagues at New Zealand’s Inland Revenue Department, Courtney
Thomas, David Walker, and Larry Zelenak, as well as participants at workshops at BYU Law School,
Columbia Law School, Duke University School of Law, Georgetown Law, UC Irvine School of Law,
University of Minnesota Law School, NYU School of Law, and Tulane University Law School for
helpful discussions, comments, and feedback on this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
Technology is revolutionizing the way we do business. Online platforms
like Uber and TaskRabbit now efficiently connect service providers and other
workers with willing consumers. This new mode of transacting has
transformed the landscape for twenty-first century workers. No longer must
they choose between working solely as an employee (subject to the
restrictions and control of their employer) and starting their own business
(requiring an investment of time and money to do things like advertise and
find a customer base). Using mobile applications, workers can now tap into
the existing infrastructure and customer network of an online platform
company, while still maintaining the freedom to set their own hours and
choose which jobs to take.1 As a result, millions of Americans have joined the
so-called “gig economy”2 in recent years, and that number continues to rise.3
The profile of the twenty-first century gig worker is somewhat different
than that of a traditional small business owner. The former tend to be
younger, less financially sophisticated, work fewer hours—often
supplementing traditional employment with gig work—and make less money.
Whereas a traditional sole proprietor who owns a catering business, for
example, might earn $100,000 per year working 40-hour weeks, a typical Uber
driver earns less than $10,000 per year and works fewer than 15 hours per
week.4 Because the majority of gig workers use online platforms to
supplement wages or otherwise earn part-time income, they are commonly
thought of as independent contractors rather than small business owners.
But from a tax perspective, there is little distinction between the full-time
caterer and the 10 hours per-week Uber driver. For tax law purposes, if an individual
earns income from services outside of the traditional employee–employer
relationship, that individual is a “business owner” for tax purposes. What this
means is that the Uber driver earning $8,000 per year must file the same
1 See SARAH A. DONOVAN, DAVID H. BRADLEY & JON O. SHIMABUKURO, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R44365, What Does the Gig Economy Mean for Workers? 1 (2016) (“[G]ig jobs may
yield benefits relative to traditional employment in terms of the ease of finding employment and
greater flexibility to choose jobs and hours.”).
2 See id. (“The gig economy is the collection of markets that match providers to consumers on
a gig (or job) basis in support of on-demand commerce.”).
3 An estimated 2.5 million people earned income in the gig economy as of September 2015, and
over 10 million reported having done so in the past 3 years. See DIANA FARRELL & FIONA GREIG,
JP MORGAN CHASE & CO. INST., PAYCHECKS, PAYDAYS, AND THE ONLINE PLATFORM
ECONOMY 29 (2016). These numbers are expected to increase by millions over the next decade.
CAROLINE BRUCKNER, KOGOD TAX POLICY CENTER, SHORTCHANGED: THE TAX
COMPLIANCE CHALLENGES OF SMALL BUSINESS OPERATORS DRIVING THE ON-DEMAND
PLATFORM ECONOMY 3 (2016).
4 See BRUCKNER, supra note 3, at 5 (“[I]n 2015, more than 75% of Lyft drivers reported working
less than 15 hours per week, and more than half of Uber drivers worked less than 10 hours per week.”).
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complex tax forms and make the same quarterly tax filings as a seasoned,
wealthy business owner. And the tax implications of being a business owner
can be severe. Because there is no employer to withhold taxes, business
owners must budget for self-employment and income taxes on their own and
pay quarterly estimated taxes to avoid imposition of a penalty. The taxpayer
must also keep receipts and other detailed records of expenses to calculate their
taxable income on IRS Schedule C, which can be a burdensome and timeconsuming process. Many gig workers do not consider themselves to be business
owners and have never filed business-related tax returns; thus they are at best
confused by, and at worst completely unaware of, their tax obligations.
For a more established business owner—one who earns significant
income, has an established book and recordkeeping system, and likely
employs an accountant—the current business tax regime may be appropriate.
But that regime is a mismatch for lower-income and potentially
unsophisticated gig workers. Subjecting them to tax compliance rules aimed
at traditional sole proprietors is not only burdensome but also likely leads to
lower tax compliance, which in turn leads to less revenue for the government.
It is also inefficient, as individuals spend hours of time navigating complex
tax rules to report relatively low amounts of income.
This Article argues for a new tax regime to apply to workers in the
growing gig economy. In doing so, it proposes two fundamental changes to
the current tax law. First, it calls for “non-employee withholding” on earnings
paid out by online platform companies like Uber and TaskRabbit. Like
traditional employers, platform companies would withhold a fixed percentage
of a gig worker’s gross receipts to cover the worker’s self-employment and
income tax obligations, obviating the need for the worker to file quarterly
estimated taxes. Second, the Article proposes a “standard business deduction”
(SBD) for gig workers. Like the regular standard deduction, the SBD would
be optional and the taxpayer could forego it if actual business deductions
exceeded the SBD. However, if the taxpayer chose the SBD, she would simply
report her net business income by subtracting the SBD from her gross
receipts,5 eliminating the need for her to track and report business expenses.
This highly simplified tax regime should improve compliance and taxpayer
morale among gig workers, as well as increase efficiency by reducing the time,
financial cost, and anxiety associated with tax compliance.
While this Article focuses specifically on gig workers to illustrate how the
business landscape has changed in recent years, the proposals could apply
5 This Article primarily discusses an SBD equal to sixty percent of gross receipts, which is based
on historic average profit ratios for small sole proprietorships of around forty percent. However, it also
considers alternatives, such as a variable SBD based on whether the worker is in a labor-only industry
(e.g., childcare) or a labor-plus-capital industry (e.g., driving a car). See infra Section II.D.
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more broadly to individual small business owners. Alternative work
arrangements are on the rise, money is changing hands electronically, and
sharing information is easier and cheaper than ever before. On the plus side,
this means that tracking income and withholding taxes are often viable now
when they previously were not. The downside is that more and more taxpayers
are being subjected to complicated tax reporting rules for relatively small
amounts of income. Thus, this Article’s ultimate goal is to advocate for an
updated tax regime that reflects the modern realities of small business ownership.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides general background on
the gig economy and the current tax rules applicable to all small business
owners, including gig workers. Part II details the two proposals: non-employee
withholding and the standard business deduction. Part III explores potential
issues, objections, and alternatives to the proposed regime.
I. TAX ISSUES FOR WORKERS IN THE GIG ECONOMY
This Part summarizes the evolution of the gig economy and discusses
particular tax challenges faced by gig workers. Many of these challenges apply
more broadly to all types of individual small business owners.6 However, it is
useful to focus on the gig economy because it highlights two trends that are
highly relevant to the design of tax compliance policies. First, digitization has
made commercial transactions traceable when they previously were not,
which can greatly improve tax enforcement. Second, the role of platform
companies as online intermediaries enables tax authorities to gather
information about multiple taxpayers from a single source.
A. Background on the Gig Economy
Advances in technology and the proliferation of smartphones have made
it vastly easier for consumers to connect with providers of goods and services
via the Internet or mobile applications.7 This new virtual marketplace has
been created by a number of online platform companies like Uber, Lyft,
TaskRabbit, and Airbnb,8 whose websites and apps allow consumers to search
6 For purposes of this Article, I use “small business” to refer to individually operated sole
proprietorships, not businesses operated through corporations or pass-through entities, which implicate
additional tax rules. Given that most gig workers operate on a small scale and frequently are not
financially sophisticated, presumably the vast majority do not operate through a separate entity.
7 DONOVAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 1.
8 While driving services (e.g., Uber and Lyft) and personal services (e.g., TaskRabbit) are
perhaps the most well-known gig economy sectors, there are many others, such as medical care,
delivery, and business services. See id. at 2. For a description of twenty-six “prominent online
intermediary companies,” see SETH HARRIS & ALAN B. KRUEGER, HAMILTON PROJECT, A
PROPOSAL FOR MODERNIZING LABOR LAWS FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY WORK: THE
“INDEPENDENT WORKER” 28-33 (2015).
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for and purchase goods or services. At the same time, the platforms allow
workers to advertise and sell goods or services in exchange for a fee (typically
a percentage of the worker’s receipts from use of the platform).9
The “gig workers” who are providing goods and services through online
platforms represent a departure from the typical twentieth-century worker.
Prior to the advent of the on-demand economy, most workers were
employees, usually sacrificing some measure of control and flexibility in
return for steady wages and other benefits like health insurance. A smaller
subset of workers were self-employed—i.e., individuals who operate their
own businesses or work as freelancers. Self-employment offers the control
and flexibility absent from traditional employment but may come at the
expense of high startup costs and income insecurity. But in recent years,
online platforms have broadened the opportunity for individuals to become
self-employed by vastly reducing these startup costs.10
Nowadays, no longer must an individual establish a customer base, incur
marketing and advertising costs, or build a brick and mortar storefront to earn
income outside of the employment context.11 In exchange for a fee to the
platform company, the customer base and other necessary infrastructure to
earn income are in place on day one, and the worker maintains much of the
flexibility and control associated with self-employment.
As a result of these relatively recent technological innovations, there has
been a dramatic rise in non-employee work arrangements in the past decade
that is expected to continue.12 Each month, more than three million workers
earn money through online platforms by doing things like driving, running
errands, renting rooms or apartments, or selling goods.13 Platform work is
currently the fastest growing segment of the labor market, with the size of
the on-demand economy expected to at least double by 2020.14
9 For a more in-depth discussion of the gig economy, including its impact on tax compliance
and strategies to promote compliance, see generally Shu-Yi Oei & Diane Ring, Can Sharing Be
Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 989 (2016).
10 See DONOVAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 2.
11 Id.
12 From 2005 to 2015, the number of alternative work arrangements in the United States rose
from 14.2 million to 23.6 million, an increase of 66.5 percent. BRUCKNER, supra note 3, at 2 (citing
Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, The Rise and Nature of Alternative Work Arrangements in the
United States, 1995–2015 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22667, 2016). The
number of participants in the gig economy has increased nearly forty-seven times between 2012 and
2015, with gig earnings increasing tenfold. FARRELL & GREIG, supra note 3, at 21.
13 See BRUCKNER, supra note 3, at 4 (“[M]ore than 3.2 million Americans [are] currently
working in the on-demand platform economy.”).
14 See The Sharing Economy: A Taxing Experience for New Entrepreneurs Part I: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on Small Bus., 114th Cong. 38 (2016) (statement of Caroline Bruckner, Managing Director,
Kogod Tax Policy Center) [hereinafter Testimony of Professor Caroline Bruckner] (estimating that
seven million individuals will work in the platform economy by 2020).
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For many gig workers, platform earnings are a secondary source of income,
often supplementing wages.15 For workers providing services (e.g., driving or
running errands), a recent study showed average monthly earnings of $533
($6396 annually), which represented about a third of the total monthly income
of those workers.16 For those who lease assets or sell goods (e.g., renting a house
or selling jewelry), average earnings were just $314 per month ($3768 annually),
representing 20 percent of total income.17 These lower income amounts,
generally less than $10,000 per year for most gig workers,18 reflect less than
full-time hours invested in gig work. In one survey of gig workers, 72 percent
reported that they work for platform companies less than 10 hours per week,
while 92 percent reported working for platforms less than 20 hours per week.19
B. Tax Issues Related to Gig Work
Currently, most online platform companies treat their gig workers as
independent contractors rather than as employees for tax (and other)
purposes.20 The employee/contractor distinction is a hotly contested issue in
this context, and many gig workers have argued that they deserve the various
legal protections that come with employee status, such as overtime pay, the
right to organize, and health benefits.21 The employment status of gig workers
is subject to ongoing litigation22 and this Article does not attempt to resolve
that debate.23 Instead, I assume the status quo will remain in place for the

15 See FARRELL & GREIG, supra note 3, at 24 (noting that the platform earnings were “sizable”
even if not the primary source of income); see also Emilie Jackson et al., The Rise of Alternative Work
Arrangements: Evidence and Implications for Tax Filing and Benefit Coverage 16 (Office of Tax Analysis,
Working Paper No. 114, 2017) (reporting that 39 percent of gig workers are primarily wage earners,
19.5 percent earn a mix of wage and gig income, and 33 percent earn primarily gig income).
16 FARRELL & GREIG, supra note 3, at 24.
17 See id. The average Airbnb host is found to earn $7530 annually, significantly higher than
average earnings for those leasing assets or selling goods. BRUCKNER, supra note 3, at 7.
18 For example, an Office of Tax Analysis study found that gig workers gross an average of
$20,000 per year, but that actual profit averaged about $6000. Jackson et al., supra note 15, at 19.
19 BRUCKNER, supra note 3, at 5. 88 percent of gig workers surveyed earned less than $15,000
from online platforms in 2015, with 74 percent earning less than $5000. Id.
20 Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 1042-45.
21 Gig workers have alleged, for example, that their arrangements violate the Fair Labor
Standards Act, which requires minimum wage and overtime. DONOVAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 8.
22 For a discussion of gig worker classification claims in federal and state courts, see id. at 8-9.
23 Some commentators have argued that gig workers do not fit neatly into either classification
and that a new third category of worker is needed. See, e.g., HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 8
(proposing an “independent worker” classification for gig workers). Harris and Krueger note that
gig workers are not as independent as true independent contractors because they generally cannot
negotiate their compensation, yet they don’t have the extensive and ongoing relationships with
platform companies that are typical of an employer–employee relationship. Id. at 7. The proposed
“independent worker” classification would carry some benefits associated with employment status
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foreseeable future (i.e., that gig workers are independent contractors rather
than employees). Thus, in Part III, I argue for tax reforms that do not depend
on gig workers being classified as employees. But first, this subsection
provides a brief overview of the tax implications of non-employee24 status.
1.

Tax Implications of Non-Employee Status

The characterization of gig workers as independent contractors rather
than employees affects their tax obligations in several important ways.
First, employers are required to withhold income taxes on employees’
wages.25 This means that most employees do not have to think about their
income tax obligations during the course of the year. Though income tax
payments are generally due on a quarterly basis,26 employers fulfill these
quarterly obligations on their employees’ behalf. When an employee files his
tax return at the end of the year, he reconciles his annual tax liability with the
tax previously withheld by his employer and, in most cases, claims a refund.27
For a worker who does not enjoy employee status, there is no employer to
withhold income taxes during the course of the year. This means the worker
generally must budget for taxes and make estimated tax payments four times
per year,28 in addition to filing a year-end return and paying any additional
balance due. Failure to make estimated tax payments can result in the
imposition of a tax penalty when the taxpayer files her year-end return.29
Independent contractors must also pay self-employment taxes on their
net earnings. Employees pay employment taxes on their wages as well, but
the tax burden is split among employees and employers, with employees
bearing responsibility for a 7.65 percent tax on their wages and employers
bearing responsibility for another 7.65 percent on those wages.30 In addition

like tax withholding and the ability to obtain health insurance, but it generally would not provide
labor law protections like overtime and minimum wage. Id. at 15-21.
24 The terms “non-employee” and “independent contractor” are interchangeable for this purpose.
25 I.R.C. § 3402 (2012).
26 § 6654(c).
27 See Joel Slemrod, Does It Matter Who Writes the Check to the Government? The Economics of Tax
Remittance, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 251, 265 n.39 (2008) (at least three quarters of taxpayers claim refunds).
28 § 6654(c)(2).
29 § 6654(a). To avoid a penalty, total estimated tax payments generally must be at least 90
percent of the current year’s tax liability or 100 percent of the previous year’s liability. § 6654(d).
However, the penalty doesn’t apply if the amount of taxed owed is less than $1000. § 6654(e)(1).
30 See §§ 3101(a)–(b) (representing tax on employees of 6.2 percent for Social Security plus
1.45 percent for Medicare); §§ 3111(a)–(b) (representing same tax on employers). Additional
Medicare taxes (0.9 percent) apply for employees paid more than $200,000 per year, and social
security taxes are not required after the first $127,200 of wages for 2017. See U.S. DEP’T OF
TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 15, CAL NO. 10000W, (CIRCULAR E),
EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE 24-25, 33 (2018). The employer may also have to pay federal
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to paying half of the employment tax, the employer withholds the employee’s
share of employment taxes and pays them to the IRS,31 so the employee can
effectively ignore these obligations. The self-employed, on the other hand, are
responsible for both portions shared by employers and employees, or 15.3 percent
self-employment tax on net earnings.32 Self-employed workers must include
payments for self-employment tax in their quarterly estimated tax payments.
Despite more onerous filing and employment tax obligations, there is a
major tax advantage to non-employee status if the worker has incurred
significant business expenses. The tax law makes a crucial distinction between
business expenses incurred by employees and those incurred by non-employees.
Non-employee business expenses are deductible in computing adjusted gross
income; i.e., they are considered “above-the-line” expenses.33 This means
taxpayers can generally take those deductions in full (assuming they are otherwise
allowable under the Internal Revenue Code (Code) and not subject to any
specific limitations), which will reduce the amount of self-employment earnings
that are subject to income and self-employment taxes.
In contrast, employee business deductions are itemized deductions taken
“below the line”—after computing adjusted gross income and before arriving
at taxable income.34 This means that taxpayers will only take those deductions
if, combined with other itemized deductions, the total amount exceeds the
standard deduction.35 Additionally, employee business expenses are
considered miscellaneous itemized deductions, meaning they are only
deductible if and to the extent they exceed (when combined with other
miscellaneous itemized deductions) two percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted
unemployment taxes on the first $7000 of wages at a rate that varies based on the amount of state
unemployment contributions made. Id. at 37.
31 I.R.C. § 3102 (2012).
32 Self-employment taxes apply if an individual earns at least $400 during the year from selfemployment, at a rate of 12.4 percent for social security (subject to the same $127,200 cap as for
employee wages) and 2.9 percent for Medicare (subject to the same additional 0.9 percent for earnings
over $200,000). See Topic Number 554—Self-Employment Tax, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc554.html [https://perma.cc/A3XS-DNPT]. However, individuals may
deduct half of their potential self-employment tax liability from their net business income before
applying the 15.3 percent rate. Id. Thus, if an individual earned $1000 of net business income, he
could first deduct $76.50. The result is that only 92.35 percent of net earnings are subject to selfemployment tax. Id. For example, self-employment taxes on $1000 of net self-employment income
would be 15.3 percent x $923.50 = $141.30.
33 § 62(a)(1). Additionally, half of self-employment tax is deductible in computing the
taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. Id.
34 The exception is employee business expenses that are reimbursed, which may be deducted
in full (above the line) against that reimbursement. § 62(a)(2)(A).
35 §§ 63(a)–(b). For 2017, the standard deduction for a single taxpayer is $6350. In 2017, Some Tax
Benefits Increase Slightly Due to Inflation Adjustments, Others Are Unchanged, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/uac/newsroom/in-2017-some-tax-benefits-increase-slightly-due-to-inflationadjustments-others-are-unchanged [https://perma.cc/G5HA-NLTB].
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gross income.36 The practical effect of these limitations is that most minor
employee business expenses are not deductible. Further, in recent tax
legislation, Congress temporarily repealed all miscellaneous itemized
deductions, including employee business expenses,37 until December 31, 2025.
Thus, from 2018 to 2025, employee business expenses are entirely
nondeductible without regard to the amount.38
The deductibility of non-employee business expenses—though
economically beneficial—comes with an administrative drawback. These
expenses must be documented on a separate form when filing taxes (Schedule
C39), which adds significant time and complexity to tax return preparation.40
Deductibility of these expenses also requires taxpayers to keep detailed
records during the year, which employees can generally avoid since any minor
expenses they incur are likely non-deductible.
Finally, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 created an additional tax advantage
for non-employee workers. Specifically, new Code section 199A provides for a
deduction of 20 percent of the net business income of any non-corporate
business, including businesses operating as sole proprietorships.41 For
example, a gig worker who nets $50,000 from gig work after expenses could
deduct up to $10,00042 (20 percent of $50,000) on her tax return.43 Although
certain limitations on the deduction apply to those with taxable incomes
above $157,500 ($315,000 for married taxpayers filing joint returns),44 the
I.R.C. § 67 (2012).
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11045 (amending § 67) [hereinafter Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act].
38 Id.
39 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SCHEDULE C (FORM 1040), PROFIT OR LOSS FROM
BUSINESS (2017).
40 Self-employed taxpayers generally must also fill out Schedule SE related to their self-employment
taxes. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SCHEDULE SE (FORM 1040), SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAX
(2017). Some taxpayers participating in the gig economy may not be subject to Schedule C filing or
self-employment tax if their only activity is renting real estate and if they are not actively involved
in providing services related to that real estate (e.g., a person who rents a home on Airbnb but
hires others to do things like clean the home). In that case, the individual must instead file
Schedule E. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SCHEDULE E (FORM 1040), SUPPLEMENTAL
INCOME AND LOSS (2017).
41 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, supra note 37, § 11011. Like most of the other tax provisions applicable
to individuals, the deduction is scheduled to sunset at the end of 2025. I.R.C. § 199A(i) (2012).
42 The deduction cannot exceed 20 percent of taxable income (less any net capital gain), which
will be less than net business income if the taxpayer doesn’t have income from other sources. See
§ 199A(a)(1). So, for example, a taxpayer with pass-through business income of $50,000 but taxable
income of only $20,000 (after deductions) would only be able to deduct $4,000, not $10,000.
43 The deduction is a below-the-line deduction (i.e., it reduces taxable income not adjusted
gross income), but is available to both itemizers and non-itemizers. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, supra
note 37, § 11011(b).
44 See § 199A(e)(2) (providing that threshold amounts are adjusted for inflation). For taxpayers
with incomes over the threshold amount, the deduction phases out and is eventually eliminated in
36
37
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majority of gig workers do not earn enough to be impacted by those limits,
and should be able to take advantage of the section 199A deduction. The
deduction is not available to taxpayers who are employees.45 In essence,
section 199A provides for a lower effective tax rate on earnings of
independent contractors as compared to the tax imposed on equivalent
earnings of employees. While this makes gig work more advantageous from
a tax perspective, section 199A will no doubt add additional complexity to tax
return preparation and to the calculation of estimated taxes for gig workers.
2. Information Reporting for Gig Workers
Because they generally treat gig workers as independent contractors,46
platform companies are not required to withhold income taxes or pay
employment taxes with respect to these workers.47 However, the Code does
impose certain information reporting requirements for independent
contractors that are relevant in this context. While these information
reporting requirements generally help gig workers track their gross receipts,
ambiguities in the current regime leave many workers without access to tax
information from platform companies.
Information reporting generally describes the process by which third
parties issue year-end information statements (often on Form 1099) to certain
private parties with whom they have transacted, while simultaneously
transmitting that information to the IRS.48 For example, a bank at which a
taxpayer has an account will send a Form 1099-INT at the end of the tax year
certain circumstances. First, high earning taxpayers cannot claim the deduction if they work in a
“specified service business” (including fields such as law, health, and investment advisory services).
§§ 199A(d)(1)–(3). Second, for those with income over the applicable threshold, the deduction is
limited by the amount of W-2 wages paid by the business and/or by the amount of depreciable
business property held by the business. §§ 199A(b)(2)–(3). For a helpful summary of these rules,
see generally Section 199A Deductions—Pass Thru Tax Breaks, WATSON CPA GROUP,
https://www.watsoncpagroup.com/Section199A.pdf [https://perma.cc/A946-NP5N].
45 See § 199A(d)(1) (defining a “qualified trade or business” as “any trade or business other
than [either] a specified service trade or business, or the trade or business of performing services
as an employee”).
46 This Article uses “independent contractor” and “small business owner” interchangeably;
both refer to non-employee workers, and the tax law essentially treats an independent contractor as
a “business owner” by requiring a Schedule C to be filed. See Self-Employed Individuals Tax Center,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/selfemployed-individuals-tax-center [https://perma.cc/H3HJ-HSJR] (defining self-employed as one
who “carr[ies] on a trade or business as a sole proprietor or an independent contractor”).
47 These companies would still have employment tax and withholding obligations with respect
to other workers who are properly classified as employees. For example, Uber does not treat its
drivers as employees, but it likely has many full-time employees to operate its business, like financial
analysts, lawyers, office managers, etc.
48 See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is
Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORD. L. REV. 1733, 1736-39 (2010).
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to inform the taxpayer of how much taxable interest his account earned that
year and will also provide that information to the IRS.49 The IRS, in turn,
will automatically “match” the information with the taxpayer’s tax return to
ensure that the interest income is reported.50
Two information reporting provisions are relevant to gig workers. First, the
Code requires that payments made to an independent contractor for services
aggregating over $600 in the tax year must be reported on Form 1099-MISC.51
In theory, this means that, if an Uber driver receives $4000 in payments from
Uber in 2016, Uber would issue a Form 1099 to the driver to reflect that amount.
However, a second information reporting provision has created some
confusion in this area. That provision requires that banks, credit card
companies, and “third party settlement organizations” report payments to
certain payees on Form 1099-K.52 Importantly for this purpose, payers that
are considered to be third party settlement organizations—that is, non-bank
entities that make payments for goods or services on behalf of others through
a central account (PayPal, for example)53—are subject to a de minimis rule.
The de minimis rule states that third party settlement organizations need
only report payments to a single payee that exceed $20,000 and represent over
200 payment transactions in the aggregate.54 Thus, for platform companies
like Uber, who appear to qualify as third party settlement organizations,55 the
1099-K reporting requirements only apply with respect to a worker to whom
the platform company pays at least $20,000 in a given year and who
accumulates payments from at least 200 different transactions.56
The confusion stems from the interaction of the 1099-MISC reporting
requirements (section 6041(a)) and the 1099-K reporting requirements
(section 6050W). Regulations under section 6041(a) state that, when both

See Treas. Reg. § 1.6049-1(a)(1)(i) (as amended in 1983).
Cf. Lederman, supra note 48, at 1738 n.20 (describing the IRS’s pursuance of discrepancies
that it finds as part of the information reporting process).
51 See I.R.C. § 6041(a) (2012). There are certain limitations to the scope of this requirement:
the payment must be made in the course of the payer’s trade or business, and the rule does not
apply to payments for goods or to payments made to a corporation. See INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., 2018 INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1099-MISC 7 (2018).
52 See I.R.C. § 6050W(a) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.6050W-1(a) (2010).
53 I.R.C. § 6050W(b)(3).
54 § 6050W(e).
55 Oei and Ring note that this position is “at least debatable,” since platform companies could
potentially be viewed as “aggregated payees” under section 6050W. Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at
1036. An aggregated payee collects payments from a bank or credit card company on behalf of other
payees and is effectively treated as a bank for purposes of the 1099-K reporting rules, meaning there
is no $20,000/200 transaction reporting threshold. See § 6050W(b)(4)(A).
56 Payments that the platform company collects from others (riders in the case of Uber) are
subject to this rule. However, direct payments to workers from the platform company—such as a cash
bonus—are not, and should instead be subject to the 1099-MISC reporting rules under section 6041.
49
50
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requirements apply, the 1099-K reporting requirements trump.57 But that
creates a surprising result: the section 6050W rules, which were intended
to expand information reporting,58 effectively eliminate information
reporting for transactions under $20,000 as long as a third party settlement
organization is involved.59
This strange loophole has created uncertainty amongst taxpayers and tax
professionals.60 For now, it appears at least some platform companies have
taken the position that the 1099-K rules, including the de minimis threshold,
govern their information reporting requirements.61 This means those
companies are only reporting income for their workers when the $20,000/200
transactions threshold is exceeded, rather than the much smaller $600
threshold for 1099-MISC reporting. Others have taken a more conservative
approach, interpreting the regulations as requiring issuance of a 1099-K in
lieu of a 1099-MISC when both requirements would apply, but without regard
to the de minimis threshold.62
57 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-1(a)(1)(iv) (2017) (“Transactions that . . . otherwise would be subject to
reporting under both sections 6041 and 6050W are reported under section 6050W and not section 6041.”).
58 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION
OF DIVISION C OF H.R. 3221, THE “HOUSING ASSISTANCE TAX ACT OF 2008” AS SCHEDULED
FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON JULY 23, 2008, at 60-61 (2008)
(explaining that section 6050W, which was enacted by the Housing Assistance Tax Act of 2008, was
intended improve compliance among merchants who do not accurately report gross income by
requiring information reporting for credit card payments made to those merchants).
59 The language in the regulations is somewhat ambiguous, however, as the final sentence
states: “Solely for purposes of this paragraph, the de minimis threshold for third party network
transactions in § 1.6050W-1(c)(4) is disregarded in determining whether the transaction is subject
to reporting under section 6050W.” Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-1(a)(1)(iv) (2010). Commentators have
noted that one interpretation is that payments to payees under the $20,000/200 threshold are now
exempted from information reporting even if section 6041 would have otherwise applied. Another
interpretation is that section 1099-K reporting applies in lieu of 1099-MISC reporting where there
is overlap, but the de minimis threshold does not apply, meaning all transactions must be reported
on Form 1099-K when section 6041 would have applied. See, e.g., Erik J. Christenson & Amanda T.
Kottke, Guidance Needed to Clarify Reporting Obligations for Online Marketplaces and Peer-to-Peer Platforms,
55 TAX MGMT. MEM. 243, 249-50 (2014) (outlining multiple interpretations of this statutory scheme);
Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 1037 (same); cf. Kelly Phillips Erb, Credit Cards, the IRS, Form 1099-K and
the $19,399 Reporting Hole, FORBES (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/
2014/08/29/credit-cards-the-irs-form-1099-k-and-the-19399-reporting-hole [https://perma.cc/9S5Z-3E95]
(noting the confusion created by the statutory ambiguity).
60 See Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 1034-38 (exploring the ambiguities in tax forms issued by
ridesharing companies and the confusion over which reporting requirements apply); Erb, supra note 59.
61 Oei and Ring report that, for 2014, Lyft and Sidecar issued 1099-Ks only if their drivers received
more than $20,000 from rides or had over 200 rides, but issued 1099-MISCs if driver received direct
bonus payments over $600. Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 1034-35. Airbnb has taken a similar position
that it will only issue a 1099-K to hosts that exceed the $20,000/200 threshold. Id. at 1037.
62 Uber appears to take this position and issues a Form 1099-K to all drivers without regard to
the de minimis threshold. See Shu-Yi Oei & Diane Ring, The Tax Lives of Uber Drivers: Evidence
from Internet Discussion Forums, 8 COLUM. J. TAX. L. 56, 65 (2017) (explaining that, beginning in
2015, Uber “issu[ed] Form 1099-K to drivers for all driving payments, no matter how small”).
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The result of some companies using the $20,000/200 reporting threshold
is that substantially fewer gig workers are receiving information statements
than if platform companies were issuing Form 1099s to workers receiving
more than $600.63 Recall that the majority of gig workers earn under $10,000
per year from platform companies, which does not trigger the $20,000
threshold for 1099-K reporting.64 As a result, not only does the IRS not
receive information about earnings for those workers to aid in its enforcement
efforts, but the workers themselves don’t receive that information either.
From the worker’s perspective, this lack of information reporting imposes a
higher compliance burden, because it forces them to keep records of gross
receipts that may be avoidable if the platform company were sharing that
information with them.
3. Gig Workers Are Business Owners, But Many Don’t Know It
To summarize the previous sections, the tax implications of independent
contractor status for gig workers are crucial. On the plus side, these workers
can deduct their business-related costs and can deduct up to 20 percent of
their net business income under new section 199A. For an Uber driver, for
example, this might mean deducting gas, car repairs, and depreciation on her
car as business expenses,65 all before calculating the section 199A deduction.
However, despite these economic advantages, gig workers also bear the
administrative burden of being treated as a “business owner” for tax purposes.
It should be restated that these workers are generally treated as such without
regard to how many hours they work, how much they earn in the gig
economy,66 or whether they also have wage income. This means that gig
workers are responsible for detailed recordkeeping of expenses, budgeting for
taxes, making quarterly estimated tax payments, paying self-employment
taxes, and completing complex tax forms at the end of the year. And while
63 In one study, 61 percent of gig workers surveyed said they did not receive a Form 1099.
BRUCKNER, supra note 3, at 15.
64 See supra notes 15–19 and accompanying text.
65 In lieu of deducting car-related expenses (like gas and depreciation), drivers can elect to
claim the standard mileage deduction, which is calculated at a fixed rate (currently $0.545 for 2018)
per mile driven in a business capacity. See Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5(j)(2) (as amended in 2010); I.R.S.
News Release IR-2017-204 (Dec. 14, 2017). For a more in-depth discussion of deductible driver
expenses and related issues, see Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 1009-13.
66 One caveat is that self-employed taxpayers are not required to file an income tax return or
report self-employment tax unless they have at least $400 of net self-employment income. See U.S.
DEP’T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 1040 INSTRUCTIONS 2017, at 10 (2018)
(mandating that, for the year 2016, a taxpayer must file a return if she “had net earnings from selfemployment of at least $400”); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2017 INSTRUCTIONS FOR SCHEDULE
SE (FORM 1040) 1 (2017) (instructing persons with “net earnings of $400 or more as a self-employed
person” to pay self-employment tax).
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some of these workers may receive information statements that help them
track gross receipts, many others do not.
Dealing with the complexity of the business tax regime is no small feat
for gig workers, many of whom are young and financially inexperienced,67 and
work only part-time for platform companies.68 Because they are often
unaware that the tax law considers them to be business owners,69 many gig
workers don’t realize that they must pay estimated taxes or that they are
subject to self-employment taxes.70 This ignorance is understandable, since
individuals who previously have earned only wage income would have no
experience with these features of the tax system.
Even taxpayers who realize that they must make quarterly payments
might have trouble budgeting for taxes or even estimating how much to set
aside during the year.71 To make matters worse, taxpayers who do not properly
budget may find themselves subject to penalties and interest when they file
their tax return if they cannot come up with the funds to pay the income and
self-employment taxes that they owe.72 Others may face additional difficulty
at the end of the year if they did not keep detailed records of receipts and
expenses. Even workers who receive 1099s may be confused about how to use
gross receipts information to calculate their tax liability.73
Business expenses are also particularly challenging for gig workers. In one
survey, nearly half of gig workers didn’t know about “any tax deductions,
expenses or credits that could be claimed related to their on-demand platform
income.”74 Even those who are aware of the rules surrounding deductible

BRUCKNER, supra note 3, at 10.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
See Testimony of Professor Caroline Bruckner, supra note 14, at 3-4 (“Many of these
taxpayers don’t necessarily realize they are small business owners or what their tax filing obligations
are until they receive an IRS notice.”).
70 In one survey of platform workers, roughly a third did not know that they needed to file quarterly
estimated taxes or what kinds of records they needed to keep, and over forty percent were unable to
estimate how much tax they would owe on their platform income. Id. at 4. These estimates are likely
conservative, because the survey covered only people who identified as members of the “National
Association of the Self-Employed” and presumably many, less sophisticated gig workers do not.
71 See BRUCKNER, supra note 3, at 11 (“43% of survey respondents were unaware as to how
much they would owe in taxes and did not set aside money for taxes on that income.”).
72 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6651(a)(2) (2012) (mandating a five percent penalty for failure to pay tax
reported on a return more than one month late); § 6654(a) (mandating a penalty for the
underpayment of tax); § 6601 (mandating interest payments for “underpayment, nonpayment, or
extensions of time for payment, of tax”).
73 For example, Uber reports gross amounts on Form 1099-K, and drivers must deduct the fees
they pay to Uber in calculating their taxable income—which appears to be a source of confusion for
some drivers. See Oei & Ring, supra note 62, at 87.
74 BRUCKNER, supra note 3, at 12 (emphasis added).
67
68
69
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expenses often struggle to apply them to their own situations.75 This
uncertainty gives workers headaches throughout the year in determining
which records to keep, and again at the end of the year when taxpayers must
deal with their tax return and accompanying schedules. Most gig workers
report that they do not receive tax assistance from the platform company,76
and many report spending between ten and thirty-five hours preparing their
tax returns.77
4. The Need for a New Regime
As discussed above, the current rules applicable to small business owners
entail significant compliance burdens. As a result, new and inexperienced gig
workers bear disproportionately high compliance costs78 relative to their
business income, including recordkeeping, seeking information about their
taxes, and preparing tax returns.79 This compliance burden imposes additional
costs that go beyond the time and expense imposed on the workers
themselves. High compliance burdens also likely lead to less accurate tax
returns filed by gig workers, resulting in less revenue collected by the
government.80 The complexity of the business tax regime also imposes
significant administrative and enforcement costs on the IRS. The
government must expend resources to educate and advise confused taxpayers,
to audit returns, and to potentially prosecute or otherwise penalize offenders.
In a broad sense, these compliance issues are neither new nor unique.
Small business owners have always exhibited low compliance rates compared

75 For a fascinating study of this issue in the context of Uber drivers, see Oei & Ring, supra
note 62. Oei and Ring researched Internet discussion forums to learn about the particular tax
challenges facing Uber drivers, and found that the highest volume of discussions centered around
business deductions.
76 See BRUCKNER, supra note 3, at 13 (finding sixty-nine percent of surveyed workers reported
not receiving tax assistance from the platform company).
77 Id. at 13-14.
78 See, e.g., Martin Sullivan, Tax Challenges for the Uber Economy, FORBES (Jul. 14, 2015),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2015/07/14/tax-challenges-for-the-uber-economy [https://
perma.cc/N9AR-C85R] (“[T]he sharing economy will be bearing significantly larger-than-average
tax compliance costs.”).
79 Of course, some gig workers will turn to a tax return preparer for assistance with their return,
which entails its own costs and does not eliminate the need for the worker to keep records
throughout the year.
80 See Mark Phillips & Alan Plumley, Effort and Compliance as Endogenous Taxpayer Decisions 35
(Paper for 2014 NTA Annual Conference, Nov. 6, 2014), https://www.ntanet.org/wp-content/
uploads/proceedings/2014/141-phillips-plumley-effort-compliance-endogenous-taxpayer-decisions.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6T4G-72DN]] (“[T]axpayers are more likely to choose inaccuracy over exerting the
effort to be accurate when the ‘easy-to-report’ amount is relatively lower than the expected true
amount.”); see also Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, User-Friendly Taxpaying, 92 IND. L.J. 1509, 1533-44 (2017)
(suggesting ways in which policymakers can simplify tax system interactions to encourage compliance).
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to wage earners,81 in part due to opportunity and in part due to the complexity
associated with the business tax regime.82 Several commentators have
identified the efficiency costs and inequity associated with this
noncompliance.83 However, there are two important reasons to revisit these
issues in the context of gig workers, as detailed in the next part. First, the
scale and scope of the businesses operated by most gig workers do not justify
the compliance and enforcement costs of the current business tax regime.
Second, advances in technology and the evolution of the platform economy
have made it possible to simplify compliance obligations for gig workers in a
way that was not previously possible for traditional small businesses.
II. A NEW TAX REGIME FOR THE GIG ECONOMY
The gig economy represents a departure from traditional “small business”
in various ways. By dramatically lowering the cost of entry, platform
companies have enabled millions of individuals to become business owners
with little to no startup cost. This has allowed more individuals to undertake
non-employee work than ever before, often on a part-time basis. In addition,
advances in technology have changed the way that business owners receive
and make payments as well as how they track income and expenses. In the
wake of these developments, the “old” small business tax regime is no longer
a sensible model. This Part develops that argument—that the current regime
is antiquated in the context of the gig economy—and proposes an alternative
tax regime for gig workers.

81 See Kyle D. Logue & Gustavo G. Vettori, Narrowing the Tax Gap Through Presumptive Taxation,
2 COLUM. J. TAX L. 100, 108 (2011) (highlighting that “individuals who ran their own businesses as sole
proprietorships in 2001 remitted, in the aggregate, only 43% of the income taxes they actually owed”).
See generally Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Presumptive Collection: A Prospect Theory Approach to Increasing
Small Business Tax Compliance, 67 TAX L. REV. 111, 112-13 (2013) (discussing the reasons for the disparity
in the overall compliance rate between wage earners and the self-employed).
82 Compare id. at 112 (suggesting noncompliance may be due to sole proprietors having more
opportunities to evade), and Logue & Vettori, supra note 81, at 109 (same), with Phillips & Plumley,
supra note 80, at 2 (noting that the complexity involved in meeting tax obligations is a factor in
compliance), and Thomas, supra note 80, at 1526 (same).
83 See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, Commentary, Eight Truths About Collecting Taxes from the Cash
Economy, 117 TAX NOTES 506, 514 (2007) (noting that “non-collection of tax due creates efficiency
and fairness problems”); accord Susan Cleary Morse, Stewart Karlinsky & Joseph Bankman, Cash
Business and Tax Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 37, 48 (2009) (“Nonpayment of selfemployment taxes is estimated to comprise $39 billion, or sixteen percent of the gross tax gap, and
is widely thought to be associated with underreporting of business income.”); Thomas, supra note
81, at 113-14 (stating that “individual small business noncompliance . . . results in a significant
revenue loss, causes an inequitable shift of the tax burden from noncompliant small businesses to
compliant taxpayers, and distorts taxpayer preferences among different types of businesses”).
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A. The “New” Small Business Owners: What’s Changed
1.

Tax Enforcement in the Old Economy

Historically, the complexity of the small business tax regime made sense
because of the nature of tax enforcement in the United States. The IRS relies
heavily on third-party information reporting and tax withholding to make sure
it collects taxes in a timely matter, and those mechanisms are highly effective.84
For individual business owners, however, there traditionally has been no third
party in place to act as a withholding agent or a reporter of information.
Consider, for example, a restaurant owner whose revenue is derived from
paying customers. Those customers cannot be expected to withhold taxes
when they pay for their meal, nor can they be expected to issue 1099s to the
restaurant owner reporting the amount they pay for a meal. So, in the case of
business owners, the IRS has had to rely on a true voluntary compliance
regime supplemented by deterrence mechanisms like audits and penalties.
The restaurant owner is expected to keep careful records of his receipts and
expenses, to make a detailed and honest return (facing a risk of audit and
penalties if he does not comply), and to pay any tax due. The complexity
associated with the business owner having to calculate and self-report his tax
liability might be seen as a necessary evil to accurately taxing his net income.
From the perspective of the restaurant owner, tax compliance obligations
are an inevitable cost of doing business. In the same way that the owner incurs
costs to rent and insure the restaurant space, to maintain a proper business
license, and to hire staff, he will also expend resources to keep records and
make the appropriate tax filings himself, or to retain the services of another
person to do so. It is likely that the restaurant owner already has a
bookkeeping system in place for his business, so keeping track of expenses
and receipts for tax purposes may not entail much, if any, additional work
that is not already being done for business purposes. He also is likely to have
a segregated bank account for business earnings and a budget for regularly
incurred expenses that include, but are not limited to, tax obligations.
From the IRS’s perspective, the primary enforcement challenge for sole
proprietors like our restaurant owner has historically been the use of cash.85
Without information reporting and withholding, the restaurant owner is
essentially self-reporting his income on an honor system. This makes tax
evasion comparatively easy for small business owners since they have ample
See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR
YEARS 2008–2010 fig.1 (2016) (finding a 99 percent compliance rate when withholding is
present and 93 percent compliance rate when “substantial information reporting” is present).
85 See Thomas, supra note 81, at 113 (noting that “small businesses dealing in cash” can easily
avoid “information reporting and withholding requirements”).
84
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opportunity to conceal or conveniently forget about receipts, particularly cash
receipts.86 Even in the unlikely event87 that the taxpayer is audited, the IRS
has a much harder time detecting income when there is no paper trail. An
unscrupulous restaurant owner could simply omit all or a portion of cash
receipts from his books and records and, in most cases, would not get caught.
The IRS’s compliance data from the past several decades reflects this reality.
While the compliance rate among wage earners (who are subject to withholding
and information reporting) is 99 percent, compliance among sole proprietors
is below 50 percent.88 The data also indicates that the majority of evasion
among business owners has traditionally involved understating cash receipts.89
2. Tax Enforcement in the New Economy
Fast forward to the present. With the rise of the gig economy, the
landscape has changed from both the taxpayer’s and the government’s
perspective. Consider first the gig workers themselves. As discussed above,
most of these workers earn relatively small amounts of income (often under
$10,000) and use gig work to supplement other earnings.90 The ease of access to
part-time gig work through online platforms, along with relatively low startup
costs, suggests that these arrangements will only continue to proliferate.
But for the most part, these new small businesses do not operate on the
scale that many traditional “small”91 businesses do. A typical Uber driver, for
example, has no employees, has little or no business experience, might not have
a formal recordkeeping system, and likely does not have a segregated bank
account for her business earnings.92 This means that tax compliance—which
requires budgeting, making quarterly tax payments, and keeping detailed
records—isn’t just a relatively minor cost of doing business as it may be for
the restaurant owner. For the Uber driver, it likely requires significant

86 The compliance rate among cash businesses has been estimated to be as low as 19 percent.
See A Closer Look at the Size and Sources of the Tax Gap: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Taxation &
IRS Oversight of the S. Comm. on Fin., 109th Cong. 14 (2006) (statement of J. Russell George, Treasury
Inspector General for Tax Administration, U.S. Department of Treasury).
87 In 2015, the IRS audited less than 3 percent of individual returns with business income under
$1,000,000. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2015 DATA BOOK tbl.9a (2016).
88 See Thomas, supra note 81, at 112. These percentages are based on the ratio of income actually
reported to income that should have been reported. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note
84, at fig.1 n.2.
89 See Thomas, supra note 81, at 113, 128 n.109 (stating that underreporting of gross income is
much more prevalent than overstating deductions).
90 See supra notes 15–19 and accompanying text.
91 The IRS’s definition of “small business” is one with receipts under $10 million. See Small
Business and Self-Employed Tax Center, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/
small-businesses-and-self-employed-tax-center [https://perma.cc/TW7U-KJGU].
92 See supra subsection I.B.3.
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additional time and effort that would not otherwise be expended but for the
tax law. As a result, gig workers spend disproportionately large resources
dealing with tax compliance obligations compared to relatively small amounts
of income, a nonsensical result that may deter future participation in the gig
economy or even foster tax evasion.
The tax enforcement landscape is also changing in the small business
sector in two notable ways. First, the use of cash is declining93 and, along with
it, taxpayers’ ability to hide their receipts from the government.94 Second,
and relatedly, the use of technology to facilitate payments for goods and
services interjects third parties into transactions between buyers and
sellers.95 An example of such a third party is the website Etsy, which offers
an online marketplace for individuals to promote and sell handmade goods
that consumers may browse and ultimately purchase. This is important from
the government’s perspective because those third parties can provide
information to the government about transactions in contexts where third
party information reporting was previously not possible. Now, under the
1099-K reporting requirements, credit card companies—and more recently
platform companies—are an important source of information for the IRS to
track business receipts.96
Underreporting business receipts, which once was the primary source of
tax evasion among small business owners, is thus becoming virtually
impossible as third-party information reporting expands and the use of cash
declines. Unfortunately, this doesn’t mean that tax evasion among business
owners is obsolete. Rather, it appears that many determined tax evaders have
simply adapted their methods to the new enforcement landscape. A recent
study of the effect of 1099-K reporting demonstrates that many small business
owners offset increases to their reported receipts by simply increasing their
reported business deductions, resulting in little change to net income.97 The
overstatement of deductions—previously a much smaller problem than

93 See James Alm & Jay A. Soled, W(h)ither the Tax Gap?, 92 WASH. L. REV. 521, 531 (2017)
(“The emergence of electronic currency as a means of payment strongly supports the proposition
that the widespread use of cash to finance transactions may be coming to an end.”); see also Jeffrey
H. Kahn & Gregg D. Polsky, The End of Cash, the Income Tax, and the Next 100 Years, 41 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 159, 163 (2014) (describing how e-payment technologies are reducing the need for cash).
94 See id. at 163-65 (“E-payments automatically leave an electronic trail for every transaction,
which decreases the risk of non-reporting of income.”).
95 See id. at 165 (noting that e-payments must be made through a third-party intermediary).
96 See supra subsection I.B.2.
97 Joel Slemrod et al., Does Credit-Card Information Reporting Improve Small-Business Tax
Compliance? 22-23 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21412, 2015) (“[T]axpayers
whose reported receipts rose due to Form 1099-K also increased expense reporting, substantially
diminishing its effect on overall tax revenues, and possibly diminishing the effect on reporting
compliance by offsetting more accurate receipts reporting with less accurate expense reporting.”).
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understated receipts98—has essentially become the new tax enforcement
challenge for the IRS in the wake of recent technological advancements.
3. Examples of Tax Evasion
Consider two hypothetical examples that illustrate the evolution of small
business tax evasion. First, consider a restaurant owner who earned $400,000
in gross receipts in a year, half ($200,000) of which was in cash. Assume the
restaurant owner also had $150,000 of legitimate business expenses. A
dishonest restaurant owner might intentionally omit much—or all—of the
cash receipts from both his records and his tax return. Thus, when he reports
his net income for tax purposes, he might report just $200,000 of gross
receipts (omitting $200,000), and all $150,000 of his business expenses,
resulting in net business income of $50,000, which would be subject to income
and self-employment taxes.99 Although his true net business income from the
restaurant was $250,000,100 the business owner’s underreporting of the cash
income is unlikely to be detected by the IRS.
Now consider an Uber driver who earned $12,500 in gross receipts from
driving in the past year. In addition to having paid 20 percent of that amount
in fees to Uber ($2500),101 assume the driver incurred $5000 of additional
deductible business expenses during the year from gas and other car-related
expenses. Because Uber will issue the driver a Form 1099-K reflecting the
$12,500 of receipts, and will also send that information to the IRS, the driver
does not have the option of reporting something less than $12,500 of gross
receipts on Schedule C of her tax return.
But if she is determined to cheat, she can instead fudge her expenses. She
might report, for example, that she had $8000 of car-related expenses, for net
business income of just $2000102 instead of $5000.103 If the driver is audited,
the IRS might have an easier time detecting her dishonesty (particularly if
her claimed expenses don’t match contemporaneous records) than in the case
of the restaurant owner failing to report cash income. However, the odds of

See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
For income tax purposes, the $50,000 of net business income (along with other adjusted gross
income) would be further reduced in arriving at taxable income by deductions like the 199A deduction,
the standard deduction, or itemized deductions. See I.R.C. § 63 (2012) (defining “taxable income”).
100 $400,000 (gross receipts) – $150,000 (business expenses) = $250,000 (net business income).
101 The typical Uber commission is 20 percent, though it varies by city, and Uber also deducts
other amounts, such as a “Safe Ride Fee.” See Oei & Ring, supra note 62, at 63. All of these fees paid
to Uber are deductible by the driver from the gross amount on Form 1099-K.
102 $12,500 (gross receipts) – $2500 (deductible fee to Uber) – $8000 (claimed car-related
expenses) = $2,000 net business income.
103 $12,500 (gross receipts) – $2500 (deductible fee to Uber) – $5000 (actual car-related
expenses) = $5000 net business income.
98
99
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the dishonest Uber driver being audited are very low, and she will likely
succeed in paying less tax than she owes.
These developments in technology and tax enforcement suggest a new
way forward for taxing the gig economy, which is detailed in the next three
sections. First, Congress and/or Treasury should clarify the application of
section 6050W to platform companies and require information reporting on
Form 1099-K for transactions that exceed $600, rather than the much higher
$20,000/200 transaction threshold. Second, Congress should enact legislation
that would allow for tax withholding on payments to gig workers who qualify
for information reporting. Third, additional legislation should provide for a
“standard business deduction” (SBD) that would take the place of tracking
actual business expenses for gig workers earning receipts below a certain
threshold. In combination, these modifications should improve tax
compliance while drastically reducing the time and resources gig workers
spend dealing with their tax obligations.
B. Expanded Information Reporting
Any tax reform proposal for gig economy workers must include expanded
information reporting, an issue that has been raised by several other
commentators.104 To briefly reiterate those arguments: information reporting
is crucial to tax compliance; section 6050W’s application to platform
companies is somewhat unclear;105 and Treasury or Congress could easily
clarify that the obligations of platform companies to report income to
independent contractors continue to be governed by the $600 threshold,
rather than the much higher $20,000/200 transactions threshold.106
Clarification of section 6050W would ensure that any gig worker who
earns more than $600 from a platform company would receive a 1099 at the
end of the year reporting her gross receipts. Not only would such third-party
reporting aid in the government’s enforcement efforts, it would also greatly
assist the gig workers themselves by serving as a method of recordkeeping.
For now, it appears that at least some platform companies are already
taking the position that 1099 reporting is required below the $20,000/200

104 See, e.g., Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 1059 (“Legislators and regulators must act quickly to
close loopholes as they arise,” with respect to 1099-K reporting); Oei & Ring, supra note 62, at 106
(“It would also be easy to issue guidance on how the Form 1099-K rules apply to the ride sharing
(and other sharing economy) platforms . . . .”); Kahn & Polsky, supra note 93, at 165 (“Section 6050W
could easily be expanded to cover the information-reporting regime; the $20,000/200 transaction
floor could be lowered to cover nearly all e-payment transactions.”).
105 See supra subsection I.B.2.
106 The $20,000 threshold was likely intended for third party payment processors like PayPal.
See Erb, supra note 59.
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transaction threshold107 and others may soon follow suit. Additionally, given
the attention that the 1099-K reporting “loophole” has received and the ease
with which it could be rectified, the odds of clarification in this area are
high.108 The remainder of this Article thus assumes that information
reporting for all payments to gig workers over the $600 threshold will be in
place, and offers two additional proposals that should significantly improve
tax compliance in this area.
C. Non-Employee Withholding
The compliance benefits of third-party information reporting are well
documented.109 Because the IRS receives information reported by third
parties, taxpayers have a strong incentive to report it and are highly likely to
be caught if they do not.110 But withholding provides additional compliance
benefits, along with efficiency advantages, that information reporting alone
cannot provide.
1.

Why Withholding Matters

While 1099 reporting may help independent contractors keep track of
annual gross receipts, it does not ease the bulk of their tax compliance burden,
which comes from (1) budgeting for and paying quarterly estimated taxes
(addressed here) and (2) tracking expenses (addressed by the proposed SBD
in the next Section). Paying quarterly income and self-employment taxes on
independent contractor income requires an awareness of the obligation, an
understanding of how to calculate those payments, and sufficient liquid funds
to make the payments.
Yet, as discussed above,111 gig workers may have a particularly difficult
time dealing with their tax obligations because they tend to be inexperienced,
are potentially illiquid, and often do not understand the tax rules that apply
to them. Those who miss quarterly tax payments may owe estimated tax
penalties, and those who cannot pay their balance due at the end of the year
will owe additional penalties and interest.112 Even workers who are able to

See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
However, legislation proposed in the Senate in 2017, which would have required a $1000
reporting threshold for all platform companies, was not enacted as part of the final tax reform bill.
See NEW GIG Act of 2017, S. 1549, 115th Cong. (2017).
109 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 84 (reporting a 93 percent compliance rate
when “substantial information reporting” is present).
110 See supra subsection I.B.2 (describing the process by which third parties issue year-end
information statements).
111 See supra subsection I.B.3.
112 See supra note 72 (explaining the various penalties for failing to pay taxes).
107
108
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come up with funds to pay their year-end tax burden may be forced to shift
their consumption patterns or asset allocations to meet their obligations.113
To address these concerns, Congress should enact legislation requiring
platform companies to withhold income and self-employment taxes from gig
workers’ gross earnings.114
Withholding would eliminate a large segment of gig workers’ tax
compliance obligations. Because a portion of their tax liability would be
collected each time they were paid,115 most workers would have no obligation
to pay quarterly estimated taxes.116 This would also mean those workers would
not have to budget for taxes during the year and worry about coming up with
sufficient funds to make quarterly payments or large year-end payments.117
This is the treatment currently afforded to wage earners, most of whom do
not have to worry about their tax compliance obligations during the year.
In addition to reducing tax compliance burdens, withholding would
enable workers to claim refunds when they file their tax returns. This is
important because studies have demonstrated that taxpayers generally prefer
receiving a refund as opposed to owing a balance, notwithstanding that there
is generally no interest paid on tax refunds.118 Surveyed taxpayers indicate
that they feel dread about owing a balance with their tax return, they feel
anxiety about underestimating what they will owe, and that they experience
enjoyment from getting a refund.119 Refunds may also serve as a form of

113 See HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 8, at 18 (describing how tax payments and penalties
“can cause fluctuations in consumption and asset allocations”).
114 Legislation proposed in the Senate in 2017 would have required withholding by platform
companies of 5 percent of gig workers’ gross earnings, on up to $20,000 of earnings. However, the
withholding provision was not enacted as part of the final tax reform bill in 2017. See NEW GIG
Act of 2017, S. 1549, 115th Cong. (2017). While 5 percent withholding would have been a step in the
right direction, this rate may have been too low, as discussed further below.
115 Gig workers, like any independent contractor, are generally paid periodically. See, e.g., Don
Reisinger, Uber Will Instantly Pay Drivers in Need, FORTUNE (Mar. 17, 2016), http://fortune.com/
2016/03/17/uber-instant-pay/ [https://perma.cc/QG2H-RERU] (noting that Uber generally pays its
drivers once per week, but also offers an “Instant Pay” feature, which allows some drivers to receive
their share of passenger payments immediately).
116 Those who earned significant amounts of income not subject to withholding from other
sources may still owe estimated taxes.
117 Oei and Ring found that some Uber-driver forum posters—who were also wage-earning
employees—dealt with this issue by adjusting their withholding levels to cover additional taxes from
gig work. Oei & Ring, supra note 62, at 97.
118 See, e.g., Benjamin C. Ayers, Steven J. Kachelmeier & John R. Robinson, Why Do People
Give Interest-Free Loans to the Government? An Experimental Study of Interim Tax Payments, 21 J. AM.
TAX’N ASS’N 55, 71 (1999); Donna D. Bobek, Richard C. Hatfield & Kristin Wentzel, An
Investigation of Why Taxpayers Prefer Refunds: A Theory of Planned Behavior Approach, 29 J. AM. TAX’N
ASS’N 93, 108-09 (2007).
119 See Bobek et al., supra note 118, at 99 (“Approximately 40 percent of respondents reported
that they enjoyed receiving a refund and expressed ‘dread’ . . . at paying taxes when they file their
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forced savings for lower income taxpayers, helping them purchase durable
goods, such as appliances.120 Notably, taxpayers’ awareness about the
economics of a tax refund (i.e., that the refund is essentially an interest-free
loan to the government) does not appear to affect their preferences.121 Rather
than constituting an irrational preference, it seems that the psychological
benefits of receiving a refund outweigh its financial cost for many taxpayers.122
There are also compliance benefits to tax refunds from the government’s
perspective. Collecting taxes in advance will inevitably result in more taxes
collected overall, as it will help some taxpayers overcome budgeting and
liquidity issues. But beyond that benefit, numerous studies reveal that tax
refunds actually result in more honest tax reporting, all other things being
equal.123 This phenomenon is consistent with prospect theory, which
generally predicts that individuals tend to be risk-seeking when facing a loss
and they tend to be risk-averse when facing a gain.124 In the context of taxes,
return.”); see also Ayers et al., supra note 118, at 56, 70 (finding that taxpayers prefer to overpay for
various reasons, including inexperience and uncertainty).
120 See Michael S. Barr & Jane K. Dokko, Paying to Save: Tax Withholding and Asset Allocation
Among Low- and Moderate-Income Taxpayers 8 & n.5 (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper
No. 2008-11, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1327119 [https://perma.cc/
9ETG-32D6] (“Tax refunds may finance different types of consumption, such as durable goods
purchases, if ‘mental accounting’ plays a role in individuals’ decision-making.”).
121 See Bobek et al., supra note 118, at 93, 109.
122 See id. at 109 (“Those who preferred to receive a refund perceived little financial benefit to
reducing their withholding and were primarily influenced by emotional issues such as anxiety about
unexpectedly owing money when they filed a tax return.”).
123 See, e.g., Paul Corcoro & Peter Adelsheim, A Balance Due Before Remittance: The Effect on
Reporting Compliance 1, 28, in RECENT RESEARCH ON TAX ADMINISTRATION AND COMPLIANCE:
SELECTED PAPERS GIVEN AT THE 2010 IRS RESEARCH CONFERENCE (June 29-30, 2010) (“There
is evidence that balance-due taxpayers have been found to understate their taxes more often than
refund-due taxpayers.”); Richard Dusenbury, The Effect of Prepayment Position on Individual Taxpayers’
Preferences for Risky Tax-Filing Options, 16 J. AM. TAX’N ASS’N 1, 2 (1994) (“[T]axpayers selected
significantly riskier filing positions and reported less income in the payment-due case than in the refund
case.”); Henk Elffers & Dick J. Hessing, Influencing the Prospects of Tax Evasion, 18 J. ECON.
PSYCHOL. 289, 291 (1997) (describing the psychological incentives for taxpayers regarding refunds);
Henry S.J. Robben et al., Decision Frame and Opportunity as Determinants of Tax Cheating, 11 J. ECON.
PSYCHOL. 341, 355 (1990) (“Noncompliance was more likely to occur, occurred on more occasions, and
involved larger amounts of money among subjects confronting the prospect of an additional tax
payment after withholding.”); A. Schepanski & T. Shearer, A Prospect Theory Account of the Income
Tax Withholding Phenomenon, 63 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 174, 183-84 (1995)
(describing the “withholding phenomenon” and that evidence “indicates that underwithholding has a
greater effect on detracting from taxpayer compliance than overwithholding does on enhancing it”); see
also Otto H. Chang, Donald R. Nichols & Joseph J. Schultz, Taxpayer Attitudes Toward Tax Audit Risk,
8 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 299, 304 (1987) (discussing the prospect theory and suggesting that taxpayers
“exhibit different tax evasion behaviors”); Per Engstrom et al., Tax Compliance and Loss Aversion, 7 AM.
ECON. J. 132, 133 (2015) (studying Swedish taxpayers and finding that “[t]hose with a deficit would
consequently be more inclined to take (legal or illegal) actions in order to reduce their tax liability”).
124 See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
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this means individuals who face a balance due (a loss) are more likely to
engage in risky behavior like tax evasion, while individuals claiming a refund
(a gain) are more likely to play it safe and report honestly.125 Consistent with
this theory, researchers have found that, across varying income levels and
sources of income, taxpayers file more accurate returns if they are owed
money and less accurate returns when they owe money to the government.126
Thus, putting gig workers in a refund position when they file their tax return
should result in more honest tax reporting by these workers.
In addition to compliance benefits, withholding by platform companies is
likely more efficient than a system under which each worker pays taxes on a
quarterly basis. This is in part because the companies can take advantage of
economies of scale that should make tax payments for multiple workers less
costly in the aggregate.127 Additionally, the platform companies already have
the systems in place (either internally or through an external payroll company)
to withhold taxes for their fulltime employees, and already have some tax
information for their independent contractors for purposes of issuing 1099s.
While implementing withholding on top of information reporting may
add some minor128 additional costs for the platform companies, the overall
cost is surely lower than the collective cost incurred by gig workers under the
current system. The availability of online payroll systems and other advances
in technology in recent years also means that withholding can be
accomplished at a lower cost than ever before.129 These cost savings would
inure to the benefit of the government as well, which would now have a
smaller group of players to monitor, and those players (the platform

125 See Thomas, supra note 81, at 131-35 (applying Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory
analysis to a taxpayer’s decision to comply or evade tax collection under various circumstances).
126 See, e.g., Corcoro & Adelsheim, supra note 123, at 23 (“The individual is willing to
underreport their tax liability to reduce a perceived loss when compared to the risk aversion to
maintain a perceived gain.”); Thomas, supra note 81, at 138-39 (“[C]ompliance improves among all
types of taxpayers when they face a refund as compared to a balance due.”).
127 See Slemrod, supra note 27, at 263 (“[C]ost savings are more likely to be realized when the
withholders are fewer in number than the taxpayers on whose behalf they are remitting the tax.”);
see also HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 8, at 18 (“Tax withholding by intermediaries would reduce
workers’ administrative burden of paying income and social insurance taxes . . . . [W]ithholding
services provided by intermediaries would also be economically efficient and improve compliance
with tax laws.”).
128 See, e.g., “The Sharing Economy”: A Taxing Experience for New Entrepreneurs Part I: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Small Business, 114th Cong. 5 (2016) (testimony of Joseph V. Kennedy, Senior
Fellow, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation) (“I suspect that in many cases, it will
be fairly simple for the platform to alter its payroll system to withhold taxes from workers who do
more than a threshold amount of business with them.”).
129 See, e.g., Kahn & Polsky, supra note 93, at 159 (“Technological improvements have made
third-party reporting and withholding more efficient, which has allowed these mechanisms to
become more pervasively used.”).
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companies) would be much more likely to have sophisticated recordkeeping
and accounting systems in place.130
Further, it is likely beneficial for the platform companies to take steps to
ease the tax compliance burdens of their workers, even if it entails some
additional cost.131 If workers feel uncertain or intimidated about the tax
compliance costs132 associated with gig work, they may reduce their hours in
response or be deterred from participating in gig work altogether.
Indeed, one study of the effect of tax complexity on labor supply found that
people reduce their work effort when it is harder for them to understand what
their net wage will be.133 In the study, subjects were given a choice between taking
part in a leisure activity or working on a task for wages.134 Some subjects saw the
wage presented as a gross wage minus a tax (i.e., a “partitioned price”); in other
words, they were required to figure out the net after-tax wage themselves.135
Others were presented with net wage information (“inclusive price”) along with
the partitioned price. The authors found that subjects were more willing to
choose work over the leisure activity in the inclusive price condition, when their
net wages were more transparent, and concluded that “[a]ny additional
complexity in the wage description . . . decreases work participation.”136

130 See Slemrod, supra note 27, at 266 (discussing the efficiency-enhancing role of firms in the
tax withholding system).
131 Some platform companies have indicated a desire to do more to help workers with tax
compliance obligations, but that they are reluctant to do so. See, e.g., BRUCKNER, supra note 3, at 16
(discussing Airbnb’s 2015 announcement that it would begin collecting and remitting state and local
taxes in certain jurisdictions). This reluctance is understandable because tax withholding by platform
companies may appear to be an admission of “employer” status, which could carry with it a whole host
of unintended non-tax implications (the obligation to pay minimum wage and overtime, for example).
132 See “The Sharing Economy”, supra note 128, at 4 (“Workers need to make a number of
important decisions including . . . how much to withhold . . . . They need to determine what
expenses are deductible and begin keeping the necessary records. And they need to complete their
tax filings in a timely manner.”).
133 Andrew T. Hayashi, Brent K. Nakamura & David Gamage, Experimental Evidence of Tax
Salience and the Labor-Leisure Decision: Anchoring, Tax Aversion, or Complexity?, 41 PUB. FIN. REV.
203, 217 (2013).
134 The subjects faced varying presentations of their wages that all resulted in the same net
amount: some were offered a lower wage with no tax, others with offered a higher wage subject to a
flat or progressive tax, and some were offered a lower wage with a bonus. Id. at 207-08. A second
experiment varied the net wage. Id.
135 Id. at 210.
136 Id. at 214. The authors of the study also concluded that the result was most likely due to
cognitive limitations, rather than preferences for price descriptions (like a preference for a bonus
over a tax), because complicating the wage description lowered work effort regardless of whether it
was presented as a lower wage plus a bonus or a higher wage minus a tax. Id. at 217; see also Johannes
Abeler & Simon Jäger, Complex Tax Incentives, 7 AM. ECON. J. 1, 24-25 (2015) (finding that subjects
have a harder time optimizing their compensation when they are subject to a complicated tax system
as compared to when they are subject to a simpler system).
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The study’s findings are relevant to gig workers because tax withholding
essentially provides workers with an inclusive wage presentation. Every time
they receive their paychecks, they can view which portion went to taxes and
what their net compensation is.137 In contrast, when workers receive gross
payments not subject to withholding, they must estimate the tax liability
themselves. This is even more complicated than the partitioned price condition
in the study (which lowered work effort),138 because many workers don’t even
know what the appropriate tax rate will be. Thus, it is possible the uncertainty
and complexity associated with receiving gross compensation payments
actually reduce labor supply and that tax withholding can mitigate this effect.
Lastly, there is a precedent for requiring tax withholding by platform
companies. At least twelve countries in the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) require withholding on some
payments to independent contractors.139 And on an analogous front, Airbnb
has begun collecting local hotel and occupancy taxes for property owners in
some cities, a move that apparently has helped them curry favor with state
and local governments.140

137 However, withholding is just a form of paying estimated taxes upfront; taxpayers are
required to reconcile their year-end tax liability with what they have paid through withholding at
the end of the year. In that sense, withholding doesn’t necessarily reflect a true net wage. One study
found that high withholding rates (20 or 50 percent) had a negative effect on work effort, possibly
because people confuse high withholding rates with high marginal tax rates. See Johannes Becker,
Jonas Fooken & Melanie Steinhoff, Behavioral Effects of Withholding Taxes on Labor Supply 6-7, 21
(Sch. of Econ., Univ. of Queensland Discussion Papers Series No. 589, 2018),
http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/abstract/589.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RST-3NZB].
But to the extent that withholding puts taxpayers in a refund position (which it does for most
people), it seems that any discrepancies between prepaid taxes and actual tax liability won’t impose
the same kinds of psychological costs on taxpayers that estimating their taxes from gross wages does.
Notably on this point, the study by Becker, Fooken, and Steinhoff found that work effort, while
decreasing after imposition of high withholding taxes, increased in the period after receipt of a
refund. Id. at 16.
138 In the study, the partitioned wage condition description did not calculate the net wage for the
subject, but the pertinent tax or bonus information was provided. Hayashi et al., supra note 133, app. 2.
139 Slemrod, supra note 27, at 263. The OECD is a group of thirty-five countries with high
levels of economic development.
140 See Airbnb: Generating $2 Billion in Potential Tax Revenue for America’s Cities, AIRBNB CITIZEN
(Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.airbnbaction.com/airbnb-generating-2-billion-in-potential-tax-revenuefor-americas-cities [https://perma.cc/869E-FNXD]; see also Alison Griswold, Why Airbnb Desperately
Wants to Pay Hotel Taxes, SLATE (Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/
2015/02/airbnb_hotel_taxes_why_does_the_sharing_economy_startup_want_to_pay_them.html
[https://perma.cc/Q7U7-JAMR] (describing Airbnb’s motivations for tax collection, including the
opportunity to gain the favor of local governments).

2018]

Taxing the Gig Economy

1443

2. Details of the Proposal
As discussed above, the current tax rules require that employers withhold
income taxes and payroll taxes on wages paid to employees, but there is no
such requirement for payments to independent contractors. Thus, under the
current regime, whether platform companies must withhold taxes on
payments to gig workers depends entirely on whether the workers are
independent contractors or employees. Although there may be many valid
reasons to classify gig workers as employees141 or to create a new, third
category of worker that is a hybrid of the two,142 resolving that issue is beyond
the scope of this Article. Additionally, from a practical perspective, it may
take many years before the legal disputes are resolved.143
But the stakes of tax withholding do not have to be so high. Congress
could enact legislation providing specifically for non-employee withholding on
certain payments to independent contractors. This change would require
withholding regardless of the classification of gig workers as employees or
independent contractors, and could be enacted in the short-term without
having to account for the multitude of non-tax considerations wrapped up in
employee status. As discussed further below, workers who do not want their
taxes withheld would be able to opt out or elect to reduce their withholding
amounts.
a. Scope of Withholding
Non-employee withholding would not have to be limited to the gig
economy. While large platform companies like Uber and Etsy are good
candidates for acting as withholding agents, those independent contractors who
don’t technically qualify as “gig workers” should also be able to partake in the
benefits of withholding.144 However, carving out the proper scope of withholding
for independent contractors requires defining a dollar threshold, identifying the
141 Some commentators have pointed out that gig workers receive no protection from
workplace discrimination. See, e.g., HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 8, at 7 (discussing the different
“protections and benefits . . . at stake” depending on whether one is classified as en employee or
independent contractor).
142 See supra note 23 (detailing a framework to create a third category of worker called
“independent worker”).
143 See, e.g., Maya Kosoff, Why the “Sharing Economy” Keeps Getting Sued, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 9, 2017),
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/11/postmates-worker-classification-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/L7JBRMUF] (describing a litany of lawsuits involving the employment status of gig workers, including
workers at GrubHub, Uber, Lyft, and Postmates).
144 On the other hand, withholding should not apply to credit card companies or payment
processors like PayPal or Google Checkout. Although those entities may be subject to 1099-K
reporting requirements, they have a much more tenuous relationship with workers (e.g., less control
over the worker) as compared to platform companies. See Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 1036
(discussing the distinction between platform companies and payment processors).
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payers that are required to withhold, and identifying the payees for whom
withholding is required. A sensible starting point here is section 6041 of the Code,
which establishes a similar framework for 1099-MISC information reporting.
First, there should be a de minimis threshold under which withholding is
not required. A logical approach is to use the same $600 threshold that exists
for 1099-MISC reporting;145 in other words, withholding would only be
required once gross payments to an independent contractor reach at least
$600 for the year. This would exempt very small one-off payments to
independent contractors. Payers that anticipated an ongoing relationship
with a service provider or seller of goods could begin withholding with the
first payment even if it was under the threshold, though there would be no
penalty for failing to do so.
In terms of identifying the relevant payers, independent contractor
withholding should apply only to payments made in the course of the payer’s
business, meaning it would not be required of individuals who are purchasing
goods or services for personal purposes.146 For example, a business that hires
a handyman to make occasional repairs would withhold taxes in addition to
the issuing a 1099-MISC to the handyman (as currently required). An
individual hiring a house painter for her personal residence, on the other
hand, would not be required to withhold (nor is she required to issue a 1099
under the current tax law).
In terms of identifying the relevant payees, the goal would be to identify
individual workers and not business entities that may also have their own
withholding obligations in the same transaction. For example, a law firm that
hires Uber to drive its employees home should not be required to withhold
taxes on its payment to Uber, but Uber should be required to withhold on its
payment to the driver. A simple, albeit imperfect, way to address this is to
require withholding only on payments to individual payees and not entities.
Section 6041 has a similar rule that exempts payments to corporations from
information reporting. The rule proposed here would be broader in that it
would also exempt businesses operating in other entity forms (e.g., a Limited
Liability Company). Presumably, the vast majority of gig workers and other,

145 See I.R.C. § 6041(a) (2000); see also About Form 1099-MISC, Miscellaneous Income (Info Copy
Only), INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-1099-miscmiscellaneous-income [https://perma.cc/57LK-KG5S].
146 The withholding legislation could be similar in scope to the rule for information reporting
to independent contractors under section 6041, which applies only to business payments and
contains certain other exemptions. However, there does not appear to be a good justification to
exempt payments for goods, as the section 6041 rules do. For example, a company like Etsy that
makes payments to artists who sell goods should still be required to withhold.
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small independent contractors are not operating as entities and thus would
be able to benefit from withholding.147
b. Self-Employment Taxes
Independent contractor withholding should cover workers’ selfemployment tax obligations, but should not impose separate payroll tax
obligations on the payers. Economically, it probably doesn’t matter who is
nominally responsible for payroll taxes; if the platform company (or other
payer) were responsible for half of those taxes, they would likely reduce gross
payments to workers to compensate.148 However, there is good reason not to
impose nominal payroll tax burdens on businesses that pay independent
contractors. Such a requirement would require additional legislation and would
further blur the employee/independent contractor distinction. A requirement
to pay employment taxes would also likely result in much more resistance to
withholding in general from platform companies and other affected parties.
c. Setting an Appropriate Rate
The most significant consideration in designing a non-employee
withholding rule is the proper withholding rate. Too much withholding would
leave workers strapped for cash, which in turn may deter work effort. Not
enough withholding could leave workers in the position of owing estimated
taxes and hefty year-end balances, largely obviating the benefit of withholding.
Choosing a withholding rate depends on several factors: the worker’s
expected annual income, her expected deductions, and her marginal tax rate.
In the context of wage withholding, the IRS uses proxies to help estimate
these three factors. First, the IRS projects expected income by annualizing
the employee’s periodic payments. For example, an employee who receives
a monthly gross paycheck of $1000 will be treated as if she earns $12,000 in
gross wages annually. Second, expected deductions are taken into account
by having employees fill out Form W-4 and claim allowances for certain
things like dependents, spouses, and child care expenses, which approximate
personal exemptions and other deductions.149 Finally, using the employee’s
projected income and the number of allowances, IRS withholding tables

147 Concerns about single member Limited Liability Companies could be assuaged by allowing
those independent contractors the option to opt in to withholding.
148 In the employment context, the economic burden of the employer’s share of payroll taxes
is generally considered to be borne by the employees. See HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 8, at 25.
149 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM W-4 (2017). Under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, supra
note 37, personal exemptions are repealed for tax years 2018–2025, which will require a new version
of Form W-4.
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apply marginal tax brackets to determine the amount that employers should
withhold from each paycheck.150
There are, of course, instances where wage withholding is not accurate.
For example, Form W-4 does a poor job accounting for marriage penalties for
two working spouses making similar incomes. Moreover, employees who
leave a job and stop earning income mid-year will pay withholding taxes as if
they earned a year’s worth of salary, and they cannot get their overpayment
refunded until they file their tax return the following year. But for the most
part, the government’s wage withholding proxies are successful in achieving
their desired goal: approximating tax liability and slightly over-withholding.151
In theory, these same general principles should apply in calculating
withholding for gig workers and other independent contractors. But
approximating annual earnings, expected deductions, and applicable marginal
tax rates can be significantly more challenging for independent contractors
than for wage earners. This is partly because the former may have income
from multiple jobs, and withholding from each payer won’t necessarily take
into account payments from other sources. Additionally, wage earners
frequently receive level, periodic payments, which makes calculating an
annualized salary fairly simple. In contrast, even aside from receiving
payments from multiple payers, the potential lumpiness of independent
contractor income makes estimating annual earnings more challenging.
Another difficulty stems from the fact that independent contractors may
incur significantly more deductible expenses than wage earners because they
can deduct their business expenses and potentially claim a section 199A
deduction. These deductions aren’t accounted for in the allowances listed on
Form W-4, even though they may significantly reduce taxable income. As a
result, if the current W-4 were used, many independent contractors would be
significantly over-withheld.
In light of these issues, a form other than the W-4 should be used for
independent contractor withholding. Additionally, because it is much more
difficult to estimate taxable income from independent contractor payments,
withholding should be set at a fixed rate of gross receipts, rather than relying
on the existing employee withholding tables. Accordingly, the remainder of
this subsection discusses a proposal for a schedule of non-employee
withholding rates, where one rate in the schedule would apply to all of an
independent contractor’s gross receipts. As detailed below, the gross receipts
withholding rates are derived by: 1) having taxpayers project their net
150 U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 15, CAL NO. 10000W,
(CIRCULAR E), EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE 44-47 (2018).
151 See Thomas, supra note 81, at 142 n.180 (explaining that wage withholding tables are
designed to intentionally over-withhold).
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business income for the year; 2) choosing a marginal tax rate that is based on
the taxpayer’s projected net income; and 3) estimating a net, taxable portion of
each gross payment by assuming a fixed profit ratio of 40 percent (which would
apply in all cases). The goal is to have withholding cover all of taxpayers’
income and self-employment tax obligations and provide a modest refund.
d. Calculating Self-Employment and Income Taxes Based on Net Income
Withholding on a gross payment to an independent contractor would
ideally collect the portion of the payment that is taxable. But because our tax
system doesn’t tax gross receipts, a proper withholding scheme must be able
to derive net, taxable income from each gross payment. In other words, to
collect the appropriate amount of tax, we must be able to determine: (1) how
much of each gross payment represents net income and (2) how much tax is
owed on that net income.
i. Estimating Net Income
A relatively simple approach to estimate net business income is to look at
historic net profit ratios for Schedule C filers and apply an average profit
ratio152 to all taxpayers’ gross receipts. The IRS’s Statistics of Income
Division publishes relevant information for sole proprietors grouped by
sector (e.g., food and beverage sales, legal services, laundry services). Across
all sectors of non-farm sole proprietorships, the average profit ratio is
approximately 22.7 percent.153 However, the overall average takes into account
various industries (such as retail stores and warehouses) that may not be relevant
for this purpose, as many of those industries might have lower profit ratios than
would be expected for gig workers and other small sole proprietorships.
Additionally, many larger Schedule C filers are included in the overall average,
and those businesses incur expenses like employee payroll expenses that would
not be typical of gig workers and other small sole proprietors.
When considering just those sectors most likely to encompass gig workers
and other small independent contractors, and eliminating payroll expenses, the
weighted average net profit ratio for sole proprietors rises to approximately 40

152 As used here, profit ratio means the ratio of net income (gross receipts minus business
expenses) to gross receipts. For example, a business with $10,000 of receipts and $6,000 of expenses
would have a profit ratio of 40 percent.
153 See SOI Tax Stats, Nonfarm Sole Proprietorship Statistics, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/uac/soi-tax-stats-nonfarm-sole-proprietorship-statistics [https://perma.cc/P9C227PF] (analyzing Table 1, Nonfarm Sole Properietorships: Business Receipts, Selected Deductions,
Payroll, and Net Income, by Industrial Sectors, Tax 2014).
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percent.154 This is consistent with a recent study of self-employed
taxpayers conducted by the Office of Tax Analysis (OTA), in which
average profit ratios were approximately 38 percent for sole proprietors
with more than $5000 in expenses.155 However, it should be noted that for
taxpayers who specifically identified as gig workers in the OTA study,
profit ratios were closer to 30 percent.156
Using a profit ratio of 40 percent instead of 30 percent to calculate
withholding for gig workers could result in over-withholding for some of
those workers, which may or may not be desirable (as discussed further
below). To address this potential inaccuracy, policymakers could calculate
different withholding schedules for gig workers versus non-gig workers.
Taking this approach to the extreme, they could also calculate different
withholding schedules on a sector-by-sector basis, which would be more
accurate but entail more complexity. But because the withholding scheme
proposed here is optional for taxpayers, and because it would be vastly
simpler, this Article proposes that one presumed profit ratio of 40 percent
should apply to all independent contractors. If policymakers deem it

154 Calculations showing weighted net profit ratios after exclusion for payroll expenses are on
file with the author and are based on 2014 data made publicly available by the IRS. Id. Sectors
considered were: non-store retailers; lessors of real estate; couriers and messengers; transit and
ground transportation; specialized design services; computer systems design services; other
professional, scientific and technical services; consulting services; other miscellaneous services;
personal and laundry; miscellaneous repairs; and unclassified establishments.
Grouping workers by industrial sector classification is probably not a well-targeted way to
summarize aggregate data for gig workers, but for now, it’s the only sector-based data publicly
available from the IRS. Each of the sectors listed here likely encompasses many businesses that are
not related to gig employment, particularly for vague categories like “unclassified” and
“miscellaneous” businesses. Additionally, taxpayers self-select sector classification and, thus, some
gig workers may misclassify themselves or otherwise choose sectors not listed here.
155 Jackson et al., supra note 15, at 34 tbl.6. The OTA study separates sole proprietors with
significant business expenses (over $5000) from those without significant business expenses (less
than $5000) and reveals an interesting trend. For taxpayers who were either primarily self-employed
or earning a mix of employment and self-employment income, profit ratios were 38 percent for those
with significant expenses. However, for those without significant expenses, profit ratios were
approximately 90 percent, likely reflecting those taxpayers engaged in low-cost, labor-intensive
industries. Overall profit ratios, taking into account both the significant expense group and the
insignificant expense group, were 49 percent for those with mixed wage/self-employment income
and 44 percent for those who earned primarily self-employment income, which is still somewhat in
line with the 40 percent average discussed above. See id. (analyzing data provided for in Table 6).
Overall, this means that taxpayers in the low expense group would likely be under-withheld if a 40
percent profit ratio were assumed.
156 See id. (based on ratio of profits to gross receipts). However, the authors of the study
acknowledge certain limitations with respect to the data on gig workers. First, the data omits gig
workers who did not receive a Form 1099 from a platform company or who did not self-identify as
a gig worker by naming a specific platform or using a specific phrase (e.g., “ride sharing”). Id. at 15.
Second, income and expense data for gig workers may also include other, non-gig work. Id.
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preferable to limit withholding to only gig workers, a 30 percent presumed
profit ratio may be more appropriate.
A presumed profit ratio of 40 percent allows any gross receipts payment
to be easily converted into net profit for purposes of calculating withholding.
For example, if a gig worker received a $1000 payment from a platform
company, $400 would be presumed to be net income. The next step is to
calculate the amount of tax that should be withheld from the presumed profit.
ii. Calculating Tax Liability on Presumed Net Income
The proper withholding amount can be calculated based on a combination
of self-employment tax and income tax rates. Taxpayers must report and pay
self-employment taxes at a rate of 15.3 percent on net business income,
although the net income subject to self-employment tax is reduced slightly
because taxpayers can deduct half of their potential self-employment tax
liability from net business income before calculating their self-employment
tax.157 For purposes of simplicity, this discussion assumes that a 15 percent
self-employment tax rate applies to all of the taxpayer’s net business income.
In addition to self-employment tax, taxpayers must pay income tax at the
applicable marginal rates provided under the Code. The appropriate income tax
rate for purposes of withholding can be determined by asking taxpayers to project
their net earnings at the beginning of the year and using the highest applicable
marginal tax rate. For example, if a single taxpayer projects that he will earn
$70,000, the appropriate marginal income tax rate is 22 percent for 2018.158
We can then combine income and self-employment tax rates to determine
a total tax rate on gross receipts. For example, for a taxpayer who projects she
will earn $70,000 (putting her in the 22 percent income tax bracket), her total
tax rate for purposes of withholding will be 37 percent (15 percent for selfemployment tax plus 22 percent for income tax).
Finally, by combining the 40 percent presumed profit ratio and the total
tax rate, we can derive a single, flat rate to withhold on gross receipts for each
marginal income tax bracket. For the taxpayer in the preceding paragraph
with a total tax rate of 37 percent, the appropriate withholding rate would be
15 percent of gross receipts (37 percent times 40 percent).
Table 1 provides the appropriate rate of withholding (right column) for a
range of marginal income tax rates (left column), the latter of which would
be based on the taxpayer’s projected earnings.

157 The result of the deduction for half of potential self-employment tax liability is that the
15.3 percent self-employment tax rate is applied to 92.35 percent of net business income. See supra
note 32 (discussing the self-employment tax).
158 See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, supra note 37, § 11001 (creating new tax brackets).
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Table 1
Projected Marginal Tax Rate

Withholding Rate
on Gross Receipts159

0 percent160

6 percent

10 percent

10 percent

12 percent

11 percent

22 percent

15 percent

24 percent

16 percent

e. Implementation Details
To summarize, an appropriate withholding rate on gross receipts should
be between 6 and 16 percent (under the assumptions discussed above).161 For
simplicity, policymakers might choose just one flat withholding rate—say 10
percent—for all gross receipts. The Taxpayer Advocate, Nina Olson,
recommended a similar approach in her 2003 report to Congress.162 The
Obama Administration also recommended withholding for independent

159 Calculated as follows: [15 percent + Projected Marginal Tax Rate] x 40 percent, rounded to
the nearest whole number.
160 A taxpayer who projects that his income will be less than or equal to the standard deduction
would be considered to be in the zero bracket for income tax purposes. However, self-employment
tax applies to net business income without any offset for below-the-line deductions. For example, a
gig worker who earns only $10,000 will owe no income tax but will still owe self-employment tax.
161 Higher marginal rates on incomes over $157,500 have been omitted for this purpose because
most gig workers are not earning that much income.
162 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 257-58 (Dec. 31,
2003). The report recommends a 5 percent withholding rate on “payments to independent
contractors not generally maintaining an inventory or receiving payments for materials and
supplies”; a 3.5 percent rate is recommended for those with inventories. Id. at 257. The 2005 Report
to Congress recommends a similar regime that would be voluntary. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE,
2005 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 391-393 (Dec. 31, 2005). The rates in the 2003 Taxpayer
Advocate Report were calculated based on IRS data using a similar methodology to the one
employed here, using an average profit of 22 percent for sole proprietors with inventories (based on
IRS data) and an average profit of 29 percent for those without inventories, and multiplying that
profit by 15 percent for self-employment tax. “The Sharing Economy: A Taxing Experience for New
Entrepreneurs”: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Business, 114th Cong. 14 (2016) (statement of
Nina E. Olsen, National Taxpayer Advocate).
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contractors on gross receipts, but under a voluntary regime where the payee
could choose from a range of rates between 15 percent and 35 percent of gross
receipts.163 However, those rates may be too high for many workers, unless
realistic net profit ratios are much higher than the 40 percent average assumed
here.164 On the other hand, a recent Senate proposal for mandatory
withholding by platform companies at a flat rate of 5 percent would likely
have resulted in under-withholding for many gig workers.165
Instead of choosing one flat rate, a more accurate approach that would not
entail too much additional administrative complexity would be to vary the
withholding rate based on the taxpayer’s projected earnings. The taxpayer
would fill out a form similar to Form W-4, which would ask her to project her
annual earnings from any source, including any net business income and wage
income. Although it might be hard for independent contractors, especially
relatively inexperienced ones, to estimate their projected net business
income, they would only have to produce a reasonable estimate within a range
as wide as the marginal tax brackets.
For example, the form could have taxpayers check a box asking which of
the following categories they expect their combined net business income and
wages to fall into: 0–$12,000; $12,001–$22,000; $22,001–$50,000; etc.166
Choosing a projected net income amount would surely be easier for taxpayers
than asking them to choose an appropriate withholding rate, which might be
confusing and daunting. The payer would then withhold at the appropriate
rate using an IRS table based on figures like those in Table 1.
The withholding table should take into account the standard deduction,
which would mitigate the potential to collect too much tax. Self-employment
tax, however, applies to net business income before any offset for the standard
deduction, so self-employment taxes would still be withheld. For example, a
single taxpayer earning only $10,000 per year from gig work with no wages or
other income would not be subject to income tax but should still be subject
to withholding (at a 6 percent rate) to cover self-employment tax.
163 See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S
FISCAL YEAR 2017 REVENUE PROPOSALS 199 (Feb. 2016). It should be noted that past legislative
proposals to impose mandatory independent contractor withholding have not had success. For
example, in 2011, Congress repealed prospective legislation that would have imposed withholding at
a rate of 3 percent of gross receipts on payments to government contractors over $10,000. See Pub.
L. No. 112-56, 125 Stat. 711 (2011).
164 For example, at a marginal tax rate of 12 percent, withholding 25 percent of gross receipts
would assume a net profit ratio of 92.5 percent. [(15 percent + 12 percent) x 92.5 percent = 25 percent.]
165 See supra note 114.
166 Because the withholding rates proposed here would be based on the taxpayer’s highest
marginal income tax rate, the categories should roughly approximate (or could exactly equal) the
marginal tax brackets. Thus, for example, since the 22 percent marginal tax bracket covers taxable
incomes between $38,701 and $82,500 for 2018 (for single filers), it wouldn’t matter for purposes of
withholding if a gig worker projected he’d earn $60,000 of net income but actually earned only $50,000.
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Even under an approach that varies the withholding rate based on the
taxpayer’s projected income, the withholding rates in Table 1 may still be too
high. One reason is that the rates in Table 1 are based on the taxpayer’s
(projected) highest marginal tax rate, which will likely overtax net income,
since lower marginal rates may apply to the first dollars of that income. A
second reason is that the withholding scheme proposed here only takes into
account business deductions (using an assumed 40 percent profit ratio) and the
standard deduction, but does not take into account any other above-the-line
deductions or itemized deductions.
Further, new Code section 199A deduction adds another layer of
complexity and potential inaccuracy to withholding. For workers who
derive all of their income from gig work (or other non-employee work), the
deduction may167 apply to their entire net income,168 which would be
relatively simple to factor into a withholding calculation. (Estimated net
income would simply be reduced by 20 percent.) But because the section
199A deduction does not apply to employment income, it would be difficult
to adjust the total net income of workers who earn a combination of
employment and non-employment income. This might not matter for
many workers: as long as the section 199A deduction doesn’t move the
taxpayer from one marginal bracket to another, the withholding
calculation would not be impacted. But it is possible that some taxpayers
at the bottom of one bracket would be moved to a lower bracket by virtue
of the section 199A deduction, and not accounting for this could result in
significant over-withholding.169
On the one hand, these potential inaccuracies may not be troubling,
especially since wage withholding also doesn’t take into account a number of
deductions.170 In fact, not accounting for every deduction is largely how the
IRS wage withholding tables achieve over-withholding for the majority of
taxpayers, providing the highly popular tax refund.171 However, these factors
may be good reason to err on the low side when setting a range of withholding
167 But for some workers, the deduction will be 20 percent of taxable income, which will be
less than 20 percent of net gig income. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
168 This assumes the worker earns less than the $157,500/$315,000 threshold. See supra note 44
and accompanying text.
169 As an example, consider a single gig worker with $60,000 of net earnings from gig work.
After the standard deduction and a deduction for half of self-employment tax, the worker would
have $43,761 of taxable income, putting her in the 22 percent tax bracket. But factoring in the 199A
deduction would mean an additional $8752 deduction (20 percent of $43,761, since this is less than
20 percent of $60,000), resulting in $35,009 of taxable income, putting her in the 12 percent tax
bracket. For the 2018 standard deduction and tax brackets, see Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, supra note 37,
§§ 11001, 11021.
170 See Thomas, supra note 81, at 142.
171 Id.
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rates. Policymakers may decide, for example, to withhold at only 12 or 13
percent for those in the 22 and 24 percent brackets, and only 8 or 9 percent
for those in the 10 and 12 percent brackets.172
f. Opt-Out
If withholding rates are too high, independent contractors may face
serious liquidity constraints until they receive their tax refund. Other
independent contractors may prefer to handle estimated tax payments on their
own without interference from the government; this may be particularly true
of experienced business owners or those with seasonal income fluctuations. To
address these concerns, Congress should make non-employee withholding
optional for the payee. The form that a worker provides to the payer could
contain an additional line that allows the worker to elect no withholding, or to
provide a reduced (or increased) withholding rate of her choice.
Importantly, withholding at rates provided by the government should be
the default. In other words, workers would be given the option to opt out of
withholding or to change their withholding rate, but would be subject to the
withholding regime described above if they did not make an affirmative
election. This would ensure that workers who chose not to have their taxes
withheld were expressing a true preference, rather than exhibiting a status
quo bias.173 Since withholding would only apply to individual taxpayers,
workers could also opt out simply by forming an entity.
The downside of optionality is that, if a significant number of workers
opted out of withholding, then the compliance, efficiency, and revenue benefits
would be diminished. On the other hand, making withholding elective would
allow those who do not prefer withholding and/or receiving a refund to opt out,
leaving in place a regime that better reflects overall preferences. Such a regime
may also be more accurate if the taxpayers who opt out tend to be the ones who
make little or no profit and don’t ultimately owe taxes.
The withholding regime proposed here would greatly simplify the tax
compliance obligations of gig workers (and other independent contractors)
and should improve compliance. Rather than having to budget for taxes, make
estimated tax payments, and deal with significant year-end balances, gig
172 Another “back-of-the-envelope” method to account for the new section 199A deduction
would be to reduce all projected marginal income tax rates by 20 percent. For example, a taxpayer
projected to be in the 22 percent tax bracket (based on her estimated net income) would instead be
projected to have a marginal income tax rate of 17.6 percent. Adding 15 percent for self-employment
tax would result in a total tax rate of 32.6 percent, which would reduce projected withholding from
15 percent (see Table 1 above) to 13 percent. The same calculation could be done for each marginal
income tax rate in Table 1.
173 For a discussion of the status quo bias, see generally Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch &
Richard Thaler, The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991).

1454

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 166: 1415

workers would have a small percentage of their gross receipts withheld each
time they were paid (once a de minimis threshold was exceeded). For most gig
workers, the obligation to make any estimated tax payments during the year
would vanish, as withholding would satisfy their income and self-employment
tax obligations. And at the end of the year, most would claim a tax refund
with their tax return, in line with taxpayer preferences.
D. The Standard Business Deduction
Although withholding could virtually eliminate the budgeting and
complexity issues associated with paying estimated and year-end taxes for
many gig workers, the burden of tracking business expenses and reporting
them on a tax return would remain. The latter issue is addressed in this
Section by the proposal for a standard business deduction (SBD). The SBD
would be a fixed amount—based on a percentage of gross receipts—that could
be deducted in lieu of actual business expenses. It would, therefore, eliminate
the need to track and report those expenses.
1.

Why Allow a Standard Business Deduction?

When it comes to gig workers deducting business expenses, the current
tax regime presents three significant compliance issues for these taxpayers.
First, the rules are confusing and taxpayers may make mistakes. Those mistakes
are probably in the taxpayer’s favor on balance (i.e., they are revenue losers).174
Second, expenses are reported on an honor system and taxpayers may be
tempted to cheat. Third, expense tracking and reporting is time-consuming and
burdensome, even for taxpayers who are familiar with the rules. The SBD
would mitigate each of these issues, reducing evasion and unintentional
noncompliance and virtually eliminating tax recordkeeping requirements for
many small businesses.
Surveys of gig workers have revealed that many have no idea what sorts
of costs are deductible from their business receipts or how to properly record
their expenses.175 It should be noted, however, that there are already some
simplification measures built into the tax law to mitigate the complexity
associated with business deductions. For example, taxpayers who use their car
for business purposes can elect to take the standard mileage deduction in lieu
of deducting actual car-related expenses and depreciation; this simplified rule
allows taxpayers to deduct an amount equal to their total business miles
174 See Phillips & Plumley, supra note 80, at 29 (discussing studies of audit data for over 55,000
taxpayers from 2006 to 2010 which found that, although many taxpayers report an amount close to
their actual tax liability, they tend to slightly underreport, rather than overreport).
175 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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driven multiplied by a rate set by the IRS (currently $0.545 for 2018).176
Similarly, a simplified home office deduction allows taxpayers to deduct $5.00
per square foot for the area-based portion of their home used exclusively for
business, in lieu of deducting actual home office expenses and depreciation.177
However, these measures cover just two of many different types of
business expenses, and even the simplified rules appear to be difficult for
taxpayers to apply. For example, in their study of Uber drivers, Professors
Oei and Ring note that drivers who use the standard mileage deduction still
face uncertainty and difficulty in tracking and calculating deductible car
expenses.178 In terms of tracking mileage, Uber tracks and reports the miles
driven with a passenger in the car, but does not report miles driven from
one ride to the next, which should also constitute a deductible mileage
expense.179 Additionally, Oei and Ring note that there is legal uncertainty
associated with miles driven while waiting for a new job.180 The
deductibility of those miles is unclear because expenses for commuting to
and from work are generally considered to be nondeductible, while expenses
for driving while at work generally are.181
Taxpayers who are uncertain as to which expenses are deductible or how
to calculate deductions will inevitably file inaccurate returns, which may
deprive them of deductions that they are entitled to or shortchange the
government of tax revenue. In the case of Uber drivers, for example, Oei and
Ring report that many drivers calculate their standard mileage deduction based
on all miles they drive with the Uber application turned on, even though some
portion of those miles should likely be considered to be non-deductible
commuter miles.182
In addition to taxpayers mistakenly over-reporting deductions, a
significant number are likely engaged in intentional over-claiming of
deductions. The ability to cheat by underreporting receipts has greatly
diminished with the proliferation of electronic payments and the decline in
See supra note 65 (discussing the standard mileage deduction).
See Rev. Proc. 2013-13; see also Simplified Home Office Deduction, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/simplified-option-for-home-officededuction [https://perma.cc/2W6W-H8ZH]. Among other requirements, the square footage may
not exceed 300 square-feet and the home office must be used for business on a regular basis. Id.
178 Oei & Ring, supra note 62, at 78-82, 80-81.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 See, e.g., Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 471 (1946) (articulating that
the Tax Court below “disallowed . . . deductions on the ground that they represent living and personal
expenses rather than traveling expenses incurred while away from home in the pursuit of business”);
U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 463, CAT. NO. 11081L, TRAVEL,
ENTERTAINMENT, GIFT, AND CAR EXPENSES 15 (2017) (“While you can’t deduct the costs of . . . trips
[to and from home], you can deduct the costs of going from one client or customer to another.”).
182 Oei & Ring, supra note 62, at 78-82.
176
177
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the use of cash. This means that for dishonest taxpayers, deductions are the
items that are easiest to strategically manipulate without the IRS noticing.
And, as discussed above, a recent empirical study of 1099-K reporting appears
to confirm that many small business owners are offsetting the compliance
benefits of new information reporting rules by simply reporting more
business deductions.183
Finally, regardless of whether taxpayers are honest or knowledgeable about
the tax law, tracking and reporting business deductions is time-consuming and
burdensome. In the aggregate, the time and money that small business owners
spend dealing with tax compliance obligations impose a significant social cost.
Further, the complexity of tracking and reporting business deductions
exacerbates problems of inaccuracy. Some taxpayers may keep shoddy records
and/or guess the amount of their deductions, and evidence shows they are
likely to err on the side of paying less tax rather than more.184 Other taxpayers
likely forego deductions to which they are legitimately entitled because they
are deterred by complexity.
In an analogous context, studies of non-business deductions have shown that
taxpayers forego itemized deductions in favor of claiming the standard deduction,
even when they would pay less tax if they itemized.185 These taxpayers appear to
give up valuable tax benefits (millions of tax dollars in the aggregate) because
they perceive the compliance cost to exceed the benefit of itemizing.186
Interestingly, one study also showed that the use of a tax return preparer did not
mitigate the failure to itemize, suggesting that it is the recordkeeping burden,
rather than tax return preparation, that largely deters taxpayers from itemizing
their deductions.187 Although these studies do not directly address business

183 Slemrod et al., supra note 97. The authors observed that taxpayers who received a Form
1099-K in 2011 were “substantially more likely to report receipts almost exactly equal to expenses
. . . in 2011 than in 2010.” Id. at 22. They also note that while bunching of income and expenses could
occur for legitimate reasons (such as claiming legitimate expenses that had been foregone in previous
years), the fact that taxpayers primarily increased “Other Expenses” on Schedule C, as opposed to
increasing expenses in a number of different categories, suggests noncompliance is the most likely
explanation. Id. at 25-26.
184 See Phillips & Plumley, supra note 80, at 35.
185 See Mark M. Pitt & Joel Slemrod, The Compliance Cost of Itemizing Deductions: Evidence from
Individual Tax Returns, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 1224, 1224 (1989) (“[T]here exist taxpayers who would
save money by itemizing but who chose not to. We postulate that they so choose because the
compliance cost of itemizing exceeds the tax savings that can be obtained.”); see also Youssef Benzarti,
How Taxing is Tax Filing? Leaving Money on the Table Because of Compliance Costs 2 (Mar. 2015)
(unpublished manuscript) (finding “that taxpayers could save money by itemizing and are aware of it
but still claim the standard deduction”).
186 See Pitt & Slemrod, supra note 185, at 1224 (estimating the foregone tax savings to be $196.2
million); Benzarti, supra note 185, at 3 (estimating that an average of $617 per person is foregone
from failing to itemize).
187 Benzarti, supra note 185, at 4.
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deductions, they demonstrate that taxpayers may forego the economic benefit of
their tax deductions if the perceived compliance costs are too high.188
2. Details of the Proposal
To mitigate the overwhelming complexity associated with the current tax
regime, legislators should enact a standard business deduction (SBD) for gig
workers. The SBD would work like the current, below-the-line standard
deduction: taxpayers could elect to deduct the SBD from their business
income in lieu of deducting actual business expenses. However, if their actual
expenses exceeded the SBD, they could instead deduct those expenses.
Taxpayers would subtract either the SBD or their actual business expenses
from their gross business receipts to arrive at a net business income amount,
to which self-employment tax would then apply under the current rules. Net
business income would then be reported on Form 1040 (as it is under the
current system) and would be incorporated into adjusted gross income,
subject to further reduction by below-the-line deductions (such as the section
199A deduction).
a. Structure and Scope of the SBD
There are several possibilities for how to determine the amount of the
SBD. One is to choose a flat dollar amount (adjusted annually for inflation),
like the regular standard deduction. This would effectively exempt all
business receipts from tax up to the amount of the flat SBD. Another
alternative is to allow taxpayers to deduct a fixed percentage of their gross
business receipts.189 Although there are upsides to both approaches (discussed
further below), this Article recommends an SBD calculated as a percentage
of the taxpayer’s gross business receipts.
The proper percentage of gross receipts for the SBD depends on who can
claim it. If made available to all independent contractors, a 60 percent SBD
may be a sensible choice in light of the withholding proposal discussed above.
A 60 percent SBD presumes a net profit ratio of 40 percent, which is in line
188 However, there are some important differences between personal and business deductions
in this context. Taxpayers who forego itemized deductions can still claim a standard deduction,
whereas taxpayers who forego business deductions cannot deduct a flat amount in lieu of those
deductions. But it is plausible that taxpayers may forego deducting some, though probably not all,
business expenses if they don’t have good records or don’t want to go through the trouble of tracking
and reporting them.
189 Interestingly, the regular standard deduction started out as a percentage of adjusted gross
income, rather than a flat amount. See John R. Brooks II, Doing Too Much: The Standard Deduction
and the Conflict Between Progressivity and Simplification, 2 COLUM. J. TAX L. 203, 210 (2011) (“The
optional standard deduction was set at 10% of AGI, up to a maximum of $500 for single taxpayers,
$1000 for married filing jointly (or roughly $6250/$12,500 in 2011 dollars.” (footnote omitted)).
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with average profit ratios for small Schedule C filers.190 If the SBD were
limited only to gig workers,191 the OTA study indicates that a slightly higher
SBD (closer to 70 percent) might be more appropriate.192
An even more accurate approach would be to separate gig workers into two
categories: those who engage in labor-only businesses and those who engage in
businesses that involve both labor and capital.193 Examples of the former are
businesses that require little to no materials or supplies and that are based almost
solely on the worker’s services, such as childcare or housecleaning. Examples of
the latter would be businesses like ride-sharing or apartment rentals, where
taxpayers incur more significant expenses related to the use of their property or
from the purchase of materials and supplies. The goal of this approach would be
to carve out those taxpayers for whom an SBD would be a windfall. For example,
OTA’s study indicates that sole proprietors without significant business expenses
(under $5000), who likely engage in labor-only industries like childcare, have
profit ratios averaging 90 percent, while those with more significant expenses
(over $5000) have profit ratios closer to 40 percent. Policymakers could, therefore,
create two SBDs. One could be a 10 percent SBD for workers in certain, specified
industries known to be mostly service-oriented. All other businesses would be
subject to a higher SBD of 60 percent.194
The drawbacks of using two different percentages include having to define
the labor-only businesses, along with potential gamesmanship if taxpayers
who are properly classified as service providers seek an improper classification
to benefit from the larger SBD. These costs would have to be weighed against
the benefits of a more accurate regime, particularly given that a single SBD
for all gig workers would result in revenue loss when claimed by taxpayers
with minimal expenses. For the sake of simplicity, the remainder of this
discussion analyzes a single-rate SBD of 60 percent of gross receipts, but the
same principles discussed below would apply if two or more rates were used.
The SBD could theoretically apply to any type of independent contractor,
regardless of whether she works for a platform company. Non-gig workers
190 See supra note 154 and accompanying text. The overall average for Schedule C filers is closer
to 20 percent; the 40 percent eliminates payroll deductions, which I use as an admittedly rough
proxy for bigger and more sophisticated businesses. Better, nonpublic data may exist that would
allow for calculation of a more accurate average profit ratio for smaller Schedule C filers (e.g., those
with receipts below $100,000).
191 It may be difficult to define gig workers for this purpose. One imperfect but administrable
approach could be to limit the SBD to workers who received income from specifically identified
platform companies.
192 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
193 In that case, withholding could be based on these two categories as well, with two different
schedules of withholding rates offered.
194 In theory, there could be many different SBDs, based on each particular industry. However,
the costs of this approach (complexity, line-drawing, gaming) likely outweigh the benefits.
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earning relatively small amounts of business income still face the same
disproportionately high tax compliance costs that gig workers do, and
eliminating any distinction between gig and non-gig workers would prevent
behavioral distortions resulting from taxpayers trying to classify themselves as
a gig worker to partake in the regime. On the other hand, extending the SBD
to all independent contractors magnifies potential revenue loss and efficiency
costs (discussed further below). The most workable approach may be to start
small, for example, by offering the SBD to gig workers only or only to workers
in a few, narrowly defined industries. If such a regime proved successful, the
SBD could gradually be expanded to include more types of small businesses.195
b. Earnings Cap
To limit any potential revenue loss associated with the SBD, and to target
it at truly “small” business owners, Congress should put a cap on gross
receipts eligible for the SBD. For example, the SBD might only apply to
taxpayers earning gross business receipts up to $100,000.196 Business owners
earning more than the cap would be subject to the current regime for
deducting business expenses. The cap would be justifiable because, at a certain
level of earnings, we can expect businesses to have better capacity to
efficiently track and report business expenses.
In addition to a cap on gross receipts earned from self-employment, it may
also be desirable to impose a total income cap above which the SBD would not
be available. For example, the SBD might only be available for taxpayers whose
adjusted gross income is less than $150,000. This would prevent high-income
employees who earn relatively small amounts of independent contractor
income from using the SBD when they likely incurred little to no expenses. An
example of such an individual might be a professor who receives a small
honorarium for speaking. Taxpayers with adjusted gross income over a certain
level are also less likely to be participating in the gig economy.

195 Further, there is no theoretical reason that an SBD couldn’t also be applied to small
businesses that are conducted through an entity like an LLC. However, if we think the use of an
entity is a rough proxy for size and sophistication, there is perhaps less justification for a
simplified regime in that case. On the other hand, limiting the SBD to sole proprietorships may
distort choice-of-entity decisions, in which case it may be better to institute an earnings cap
applicable to any non-corporate entity.
196 An alternative to having the cap turn the SBD “off ” would be to allow taxpayers to deduct
the SBD from the first portion of their earnings up to cap, and then any excess earnings would be
subject to the current rules for business deductions. But since the primary benefit of the SBD is to
allow taxpayers to forego tracking expenses, it makes little sense to allow it for a threshold level of
earnings if businesses will still have to track and report expenses above the threshold; at that point
it serves as a subsidy rather than a simplification measure.

1460

[Vol. 166: 1415

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

c. Flat Versus Percentage SBD: An Example
To further explore the implications of a 60 percent SBD, and to contrast
it with a flat SBD, it is useful to consider a simple example. Assume there are
four taxpayers: Taxpayer 1 has $5000 of gross business receipts and $4500 of
actual business expenses; Taxpayer 2 has $5000 of gross business receipts and
$2500 of actual business expenses; Taxpayer 3 has $30,000 of gross business
receipts and $27,000 of actual business expenses; and Taxpayer 4 has $30,000
of gross business receipts and $15,000 of actual business expenses. For
simplicity, assume the sole tax rate on all income is 20 percent. Table 2 depicts
the consequences of both a $10,000 SBD and a 60 percent SBD.197
Table 2
Taxpayer 1

Taxpayer 2

Taxpayer 3

Taxpayer 4

Gross Receipts

$5000

$5000

$30,000

$30,000

Actual Expenses

$4500

$2500

$27,000

$15,000

Profit ratio

10%

50%

10%

50%

Actual Net Income

$500

$2500

$3000

$15,000

Actual Tax (20% rate)

$100

$500

$600

$3000

Net After
$10,000 SBD

__

__

$20,000

$20,000

Tax After
$10,000 SBD

0

0

$4000

$4000

Net After 60% SBD

$2000

$2000

$12,000

$12,000

Tax After 60% SBD

$400

$400

$2400

$2400

197 The example is oversimplified, because net business income will be subject to further
reductions before arriving at taxable income (e.g., itemized deductions or the (regular) standard
deduction). It is useful, therefore, to assume in this example that the taxpayer has income from other
sources that exceeds the zero bracket created by the regular standard deduction and that net business
income will be subject to tax.
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d. Costs and Benefits of an SBD
Although the example in Table 2 doesn’t cover every scenario, there are
several general principles that can be observed. First, recall that a 60 percent
SBD assumes that taxpayers have a profit ratio of 40 percent. This means that
imposing a 60 percent SBD creates a revenue loss to the government for any
taxpayer with a net profit ratio that is higher than 40 percent. The higher the
actual net profit ratio, the greater the revenue loss will be. In the above
example, Taxpayer 4 has a net profit ratio of 50 percent, and accordingly pays
less tax ($2400 as opposed to $3000) with a 60 percent SBD.
The reverse would be true for taxpayers with a net profit ratio below 40
percent. For example, Taxpayer 3 has only a 10 percent profit ratio, and would
pay significantly more tax under a 60 percent SBD ($2400 instead of $600).
Thus, presumably Taxpayer 3 would forego the SBD and claim actual
expenses, unless she determines that the compliance costs of claiming actual
expenses exceed the tax benefit.
Because some taxpayers with lower profit ratios will presumably claim
actual expenses,198 it is uncertain if revenue gains and losses would cancel each
other out. If there is a substantial number of taxpayers with profit ratios above
the 40 percent ratio assumed by the 60 percent SBD (or if taxpayers who earn
more than a 40 percent ratio have substantially higher receipts than those who
do not), the revenue loss could be significant. But this is not necessarily fatal.
The SBD will save significant compliance costs for affected taxpayers, and
will also reduce administrative costs for the government, which must expend
resources to monitor business deductions.199 Thus, potential revenue loss
from the SBD must be weighed against these reduced compliance and
administrative costs. However, the potential revenue loss also highlights the
need for policymakers to carefully analyze the appropriate percentage amount
for the SBD: further study may reveal that 60 percent is too high (or low)
and that a different percentage (e.g., 50 percent) would be a more accurate
proxy for business expenses. But while lowering the SBD would mitigate tax
revenue loss, it would cause more taxpayers to claim actual expenses, which
would diminish the reduction in compliance and administrative costs.

198 But, as discussed above, other taxpayers will likely forego claiming actual expenses, even if
it would result in less tax liability. See supra notes 185–187 and accompanying text.
199 Cf. Louis Kaplow, The Standard Deduction and Floors in the Income Tax, 50 TAX L. REV. 1, 9
(1994) (arguing that the regular standard deduction lowers compliance costs because it allows for
“reduced recordkeeping, effort in learning the law, and time spent completing tax forms.
Administrative cost savings include a reduction in effort to process returns, the need to audit returns,
and the time required to conduct audits and engage in subsequent litigation.”).
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e. Equity Implications of an SBD
The SBD also involves trading off some degree of horizontal equity for
reduced compliance and administrative costs.200 In the above example,
Taxpayer 3 has actual net income of $3000 while Taxpayer 4 has actual net
income of $15,000. Yet under either version of the SBD (60 percent or flat
$10,000), they pay identical amounts of tax because they earned the same
amount of gross receipts. Taxpayer 3 is overtaxed with the 60 percent SBD
while Taxpayer 4 is undertaxed. If Taxpayer 3 opts out of the SBD, horizontal
inequity is diminished but remains; in that case, Taxpayer 3 pays tax at a 20
percent rate on actual net income while Taxpayer 4 pays $2400 of tax on
$15,000 of actual net income, an effective rate of 16 percent.
The same issue exists for Taxpayers 1 and 2. Again, the violation of
horizontal equity is not necessarily fatal; rather, it is a cost that must be
weighed against the simplification benefit of an SBD. This is precisely the
same tradeoff that is made with the current standard deduction: some degree
of accuracy and horizontal equity is sacrificed in exchange for the
simplification benefits of foregoing itemization.201
f. Additional Drawbacks of a Flat SBD
The flat SBD raises some additional issues. Taxpayers with gross receipts
at or below the flat amount would pay no tax on their business income, as is
the case with Taxpayer 1 and Taxpayer 2 in the above example. This would
cost the government more in lost tax revenue for those taxpayers below the
threshold as compared to the percentage SBD, because taxpayers claiming the
60 percent SBD would pay tax on their presumed 40 percent profit. For
example, Taxpayers 1 and 2 pay $400 in tax with a 60 percent SBD and nothing
with a $10,000 SBD.
An upside of this approach is that it may be costless for these taxpayers
to determine whether they should take the flat SBD or claim actual
deductions. Whereas taxpayers claiming a 60 percent SBD would have to
estimate whether their actual deductions exceeded 60 percent of their
receipts, taxpayers claiming a flat $10,000 deduction would not have to make

200 Cf. Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Analyzing the Standard Deduction as a Presumptive Tax,
1 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 25, 27 (1994) (discussing the tradeoff between horizontal equity and
compliance costs in the case of the regular standard deduction).
201 Id. at 28; see also Kaplow, supra note 199, at 19-20 (“A higher threshold [for itemizing]
sacrifices equity . . . but reduces compliance and administrative costs.”). In addition to
simplification, the regular standard deduction is also intended to promote progressivity, as it creates
a zero bracket amount. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 189, at 205 (“The progressivity purpose . . . is
served by having a relatively large amount of otherwise taxable income go untaxed, through what is
in essence a zero-percent tax bracket made of the standard deduction and personal exemptions.”).
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such a calculation if their receipts were close to or under $10,000. However,
while both a flat SBD and a percentage SBD pose horizontal equity issues,
the perceived unfairness of a flat SBD may be greater, because it will be highly
salient that taxpayers making under a fixed amount of gross receipts will be
exempt from tax on their business receipts. This higher salience may lead to
more behavioral distortions (e.g., overinvestment in the gig economy) than
would be the case with a percentage SBD.
Once the taxpayer’s gross receipts exceed a certain amount,202 the flat
SBD would result in more revenue collected than the percentage SBD, as the
benefit to the taxpayer decreases. For example, Taxpayer 3 and Taxpayer 4
make $30,000 in gross receipts, so the $10,000 SBD results in significantly
more tax liability ($4000) compared to the 60 percent SBD ($2400). But as
gross receipts rise significantly above the flat SBD, fewer taxpayers will claim
it, as business deductions are likely to exceed the SBD. (Neither Taxpayer 3
nor Taxpayer 4 should claim the flat SBD in this example; although they
might if they did not keep records.) This again means that the compliance
and administrative benefits diminish. And whereas a percentage SBD could
be advantageous for taxpayers at all levels of gross receipts (up to any cap
imposed), a flat SBD would have a narrower reach.
g. Coordination with Gross Receipts Withholding
An additional advantage of a percentage SBD is that it is easier to coordinate
with gross receipts withholding than a flat SBD. A major drawback of
withholding on gross receipts is that those receipts may not be an accurate
indicator of net income and, therefore, taxpayers may be grossly under-withheld
or over-withheld. However, if policymakers can assume a fixed net profit
ratio, then net business income is easy to estimate: it is simply the assumed
profit ratio multiplied by gross receipts. Once net income can be estimated,
withholding on business earnings is not unlike withholding on wages. Thus,
using a 60 percent SBD would allow policymakers to assume that net business
income is 40 percent of gross receipts and withhold on that basis. While these
assumptions won’t hold up for taxpayers who don’t claim the SBD, that should
only be a minority of business owners if the SBD is set sufficiently high.
Further, because taxpayers who forego the 60 percent SBD typically will
do so because they have expenses that exceed 60 percent of their gross
receipts (i.e., a profit ratio lower than 40 percent), those taxpayers will end
up over-withheld, rather than under-withheld. While this may create
liquidity issues for taxpayers who are severely over-withheld, for many, it may
202 For a $10,000 SBD, the benefit will be equivalent to a 60 percent SBD when gross receipts
are $16,667; thereafter the $10,000 SBD is less advantageous to the taxpayer.
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simply increase the size of their tax refund, which should have a positive
impact on tax compliance. Those taxpayers who are concerned about overwithholding could elect to reduce their withholding when they fill out the
equivalent of a Form W-4 for the payer.
The proper withholding amount is harder to approximate with a flat SBD.
The more a taxpayer’s business expenses exceed the SBD, the less likely they
are to claim it. And while withholding could continue to be based on an
assumed profit ratio of 40 percent, far fewer businesses would claim exactly
60 percent in expenses as compared to when the SBD was set at 60 percent
of gross receipts. Thus, withholding is more likely to be inaccurate for more
taxpayers with a flat SBD.
In light of its advantages over a flat SBD, this Article recommends that
Congress enact a percentage SBD for gig workers earning gross receipts
under a certain threshold. The remainder of this Article will assume that 60
percent is an appropriate percentage (based on IRS data on average profit
ratios), but further study may suggest a different percentage.
E. Combining the Proposals: Examples
This section will expand on the example discussed above to illustrate the
application of non-employee withholding in conjunction with a 60 percent
SBD. For purposes of the example, consider six hypothetical taxpayers, A
through F, with the gross business receipts and expenses depicted below in
Table 3. Taxpayers A, B, and C each have $5000 of gross receipts, but have
net profit ratios of 10 percent, 40 percent, and 80 percent, respectively.
Taxpayers D, E, and F each have $30,000 of gross receipts, and also have net
profit ratios of 10 percent, 40 percent, and 80 percent, respectively. Each of
A-F performs services as an independent contractor for a single company.
Assume further that each taxpayer is single with no dependents. Finally,
assume Taxpayers A, B, and C each have $25,000 in wage income, no other
income, and no itemized deductions, which means the marginal tax rate on
their business income should be 12 percent.203 Accordingly, assume that they
will be subject to withholding at a rate of 11 percent of their gross receipts.204
Similarly, assume no other income or deductions for Taxpayers E, F, and G,
except each has wages of $50,000, making their marginal tax rate 22 percent.205

203 See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, supra note 37, § 11001 (establishing a 12 percent marginal tax rate
for single filers making between $9,525 and $38,700).
204 See supra tbl.1.
205 See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, supra note 37, § 11001(a) (establishing a 22 percent marginal tax
rate for single filers making between $38,700 and $82,500).
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Assume that Taxpayers E, F and G are thus subject to withholding at a rate
of 15 percent of their gross receipts.206
Table 3 below depicts each taxpayer’s SBD, tax liability, withholding, and
overpayment (i.e., potential refund amount) based on the assumed facts. It is
assumed that Taxpayers A and D, each of whom has a net profit ratio of 10
percent (i.e., actual expenses that exceed the 60 percent SBD), will claim
actual expenses for purposes of this example, although that will not
necessarily be the case. Taxpayers C and F, on the other hand, will claim the
SBD because it exceeds their actual expenses. Taxpayers B and E have actual
expenses equal to 60 percent of their gross receipts, so they will claim the
SBD, but the result would be the same if they claimed actual expenses.
Table 3
A

B

C

Gross Receipts

$5000

$5000

$5000

$30,000

$30,000

$30,000

Actual Expenses

$4500

$3000

$1000

$27,000

$18,000

$6000

Actual Net
Income

$500

$2000

$4000

$3000

$12,000

$24,000

Net Profit Ratio

10%

40%

80%

10%

40%

80%

Total
Without SBD

$130

$500

$1010

$1030

$4140

$8270

60% SBD

$3000

$3000

$3000

$18,000

$18,000

$18,000

Net Income
After 60% SBD

$2000

$2000

$2000

$12,000

$12,000

$12,000

Total Tax
With SBD

$500

$500

$500

$4140

$4140

$4140

Withheld
Amount

$550
(11%)

$550
(11%)

$550
(11%)

$4500
(15%)

$4500
(15%)

$4500
(15%)

Overpayment

$420

$50

$50

$3470

$360

$360

Taxpayer

Tax207

D

E

F

See supra tbl.1.
The “Total Tax” is comprised of self-employment tax plus income tax, taking into account
the deductibility of half of self-employment tax. It can be calculated by the following formula:
N(0.93T + 0.14), where N is net business income and T is the marginal income tax rate—here, 12
percent for Taxpayers A, B, and C and 22 percent for Taxpayers D, E, and F. Values are rounded to
the nearest $10.
206
207
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Because withholding rates are based on an assumed profit ratio of 40
percent, the 60 percent SBD will provide a modest refund208 for taxpayers
that claim it, as can be seen in the case of Taxpayers B, C, E, and F.209 Those
with higher expenses who forego the SBD will have a larger refund ($420 for
Taxpayer A instead of $50; $3,470 for Taxpayer D instead of $360). To the
extent that taxpayers have significant other deductions, their ultimate tax
liability will be reduced and their refunds will increase.
To simplify the example, the section 199A deduction is not incorporated
into the taxpayers’ tax liability in Table 3. Doing so would require extra steps
in calculating the tax due, but does not significantly alter the example or
change the overall application of the SBD.210
III. ISSUES AND OBJECTIONS
Each of the proposals in this Article has potential drawbacks, which are
discussed in this Part.
A. The Scope of the Proposals
To begin with, critics of the proposals here might argue that the scope of
the problem is too small to merit congressional action. They might assert, for
example, that the size of the gig economy is small relative to the overall
economy, and that the dollar amounts of tax involved do not merit
policymakers’ attention. However, there are several reasons why the reforms
discussed here would be worthwhile. First, the gig economy itself is
expanding and the number of American taxpayers participating in it is
projected to grow substantially in the next several years.211 As technology
continues to evolve, new alternative work arrangements will also likely crop
up that might not constitute “gig work” but implicate the same tax compliance
and administrative issues.
208 The modest refund—rather than a zero balance—results because the withholding rules
proposed here assume a 15 percent self-employment tax rate and no deduction for self-employment
tax, which will slightly overtax. See supra note 207.
209 This assumes that these taxpayers do not have significant other income that is not subject
to withholding, which could cause them to owe a balance.
210 Because the section 199A deduction is taken below the line, after calculating net business
income, it does not affect the calculation of the SBD and should not impact a taxpayer’s decision to
claim (or not claim) the SBD. The total tax due would be adjusted by reducing net business income
(after application of either the SBD or actual expenses) by the lesser of: (i) 20 percent of net business
income or (ii) 20 percent of taxable income less net capital gain. The deduction applies for purposes
of calculating income tax, but not self-employment tax.
211 See supra note 12; see also Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 1054 (“[T]o the extent the new modes
of production and consumption erode the traditional tax base, greater policy attention and new
compliance solutions may be required.”).
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Second, the reforms proposed here are also relevant for more traditional
small business owners. On the one hand, extending the SBD to all sole
proprietors might cause too much tax revenue loss past a certain threshold of
earnings and, arguably, is no longer justifiable once businesses achieve the
scope and scale to handle tax compliance obligations more efficiently.
However, if the SBD can be successfully implemented for gig workers, it
could eventually be expanded to cover other small businesses owners earning
below a certain threshold of receipts.
Additionally, even if the aggregate dollars at stake are low relative to other
pressing tax reform issues, there is merit to improving tax compliance among
truly small businesses. For example, some scholars have argued that while it
may not raise significant amounts of revenue in the short-term, improving tax
compliance among small businesses “bring[s] firms into the tax net, thus ensuring
higher tax compliance if they expand over time.”212 Further, reciprocity theory
suggests that improving compliance among one group of taxpayers may have
positive spillover effects that boost compliance more broadly.213
B. Objections Related to Withholding
There are several constituencies that may object to non-employee
withholding for gig workers and other independent contractors. First, the
parties required to withhold may object because they do not want to incur the
additional cost associated with tax withholding. However, for larger platform
companies like Uber or TaskRabbit, the benefits of withholding for workers
may exceed the financial costs of withholding. This is because simplifying
workers’ tax compliance obligations may encourage work effort in general and
make platform companies more attractive businesses to work for.214 Notably
on this point, Etsy has recently advocated for optional tax withholding for its
workers (and other gig workers), which number over 1 million.215
Even for those payers that would not necessarily benefit financially, the
costs of withholding are relatively modest in the technological age. Affected
payers would already have payroll systems in place for issuing 1099s, so it is
unlikely that imposing a withholding requirement would be overly
burdensome. Further, economies of scale likely exist that make payer
212 Anuradha Joshi, Wilson Prichard & Christopher Heady, Taxing the Informal Economy: The
Current State of Knowledge and Agendas for Future Research, 50 J. DEV. STUD. 1325, 1329 (2014).
213 See Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and the Law, 102 MICH.
L. REV. 71, 81 (2003) (“If most other individuals seem to be paying their taxes, then evasion will
provoke either guilt, shame, or both in the reciprocator who covets the respect of others and of
herself. If . . . most individuals appear to be evading, then complying won’t make her feel guilty or
ashamed at all.”).
214 See supra notes 133–36 and accompanying text.
215 ETSY, ECONOMIC SECURITY FOR THE GIG ECONOMY 4, 8-9 (2016).
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withholding less costly on an aggregate basis as compared to the cost of
individual workers remitting taxes during the year.
Others may object to expanding withholding on theoretical grounds,
arguing that it reduces the perceived burden of taxes and gives the
government too much power to tax.216 Critics of withholding have also noted
that a tax refund essentially amounts to an interest-free loan to the
government.217 But those concerns are outweighed by the fact that
withholding has a profoundly positive impact on tax compliance, making it
one of the most powerful and important tax enforcement mechanisms at the
government’s disposal.
For example, in the case of wage withholding, the compliance rate is
nearly perfect at 99 percent.218 And as discussed above in subsection II.C.1,
withholding provides benefits that go beyond the deterrence advantages of
third-party information reporting because it helps resolve liquidity and
budgeting issues that may arise when taxpayers file their returns.
Additionally, refunds resulting from tax withholding appear to have powerful
framing effects that positively influence compliance. Further,
notwithstanding arguments that withholding concedes too much taxing
power to the government, it may be in line with taxpayer preferences.
Although more empirical work should be done to understand taxpayers’
withholding preferences, it appears they prefer receiving a refund to owing a
balance, in part to avoid uncertainty and complexity in ascertaining their tax
liability.219 Further, because the withholding regime proposed here would
allow for an opt-out, those taxpayers who prefer not to receive a refund could
elect to pay estimated taxes instead.
The most serious challenge to non-employee withholding is that finding
an appropriate rate at which to withhold on gross receipts may turn out to be
difficult as a practical matter. This concern about accuracy is important but is
not insurmountable. It should be noted that no withholding regime—even
wage withholding—is entirely accurate. The vast majority of employees
receive significant tax refunds (with the average refund being approximately
$3000220), yet it does not appear that wage withholding results in major
liquidity issues for most taxpayers. Further, employees can alter their form
W-4 to increase or decrease their withholding to bring it more in line with
216 See, e.g., Aradhna Krishna & Joel Slemrod, Behavioral Public Finance: Tax Design as Price
Presentation, 10 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 189, 194 (2003).
217 See, e.g., Richard L. Doernberg, The Case Against Withholding, 61 TEX. L. REV. 595, 623
(1982) (“Since the IRS normally computes overwithholding refunds without interest, the system
causes taxpayers to forego the use of their funds during the year without compensation.”).
218 See supra note 84.
219 See supra notes 118–122 and accompanying text.
220 Thomas, supra note 81, at 142 n.181.
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their personal circumstances; independent contractors would be given an
analogous option under the regime proposed here.
The main challenge is finding the right balance between withholding
enough tax to reap the compliance advantages, and not withholding so much
tax as to wreak havoc on taxpayers’ finances. It’s possible that in the case of
independent contractors like gig workers, further study of tax data may reveal
a more appropriate presumed profit ratio based on average or modal values.
Such a study is beyond the scope of this Article, but it suffices to say for this
purpose that this information is ascertainable. Further, if non-employee
withholding were combined with a 60 percent SBD, then accuracy would be
significantly easier to achieve for those taxpayers who claimed the SBD. But
even if an SBD were not politically feasible, non-employee withholding as a
standalone policy continues to have merit.
C. Objections Related to the SBD
Calculating an appropriate percentage for the SBD comes with the same
practical challenges that calculating a withholding rate does and, as
mentioned above, further study may indicate that a higher or lower
percentage is better targeted, or that having multiple SBDs is preferable. But
even assuming that a 60 percent SBD will approximate business expenses for
the largest number of affected taxpayers, an SBD still may impose efficiency
and revenue costs that must be weighed against its benefits.
As discussed above in subsection II.D.2, an elective SBD may reduce tax
revenues because taxpayers with expenses that are below the 60 percent
threshold would claim it while those that are above the threshold would not,
meaning more deductions would be claimed overall. It’s not clear that this
would be the case in practice, however, because some taxpayers above the 60
percent threshold may still choose the SBD, analogous to taxpayers who
currently forego itemization in lieu of the standard deduction. Those
taxpayers may be acting rationally if the cost of tracking and reporting
business expenses exceeds the benefit of foregoing the SBD.
The principal argument behind the SBD, however, is that any potential
revenue loss would be outweighed by the social gains resulting from reduced
compliance burdens for taxpayers and reduced administrative costs for the
IRS. An SBD implemented in conjunction with information reporting and
withholding would be even more cost-effective, as these latter measures
would undoubtedly reduce tax evasion and enhance revenue collection.
Whether an SBD standing on its own would reduce tax evasion, however, is
uncertain and merits further study.
One source of uncertainty is whether a significant number of
noncompliant taxpayers would forego the SBD in order to claim a higher
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amount of expenses, attempting to “zero out” their income or come close to
it. The SBD proposed here would be elective, so if taxpayers truly incurred
business expenses that exceeded 60 percent of their gross receipts, they would
be able to deduct those actual expenses and the overall measurement of their
taxable income would be more accurate. But if a disproportionate number of
taxpayers who forego the SBD are noncompliant taxpayers who are
overclaiming expenses, then the potential revenue loss would be exacerbated
by this evasion. However, there are several reasons that even noncompliant
types might forego this strategy and still claim the SBD.
First, if withholding is implemented, most taxpayers will be claiming a refund
when they prepare their tax returns. Because taxpayers facing a gain tend to be
more compliant overall, the framing advantage created by withholding may
dissuade the overclaiming of expenses, as compared to the case where taxpayers
overclaim expenses to avoid paying a balance when they file their return.
Second, the presence of an SBD would allow the IRS to focus its
enforcement resources on a smaller group of taxpayers who do not claim it,
effectively making those who claim the SBD “audit-proof.” Even those
taxpayers who would otherwise be prone to cheating may perceive that they
will avoid IRS scrutiny more effectively by claiming the SBD and that,
conversely, claiming expenses in excess of the SBD will invite IRS scrutiny.
Accordingly, there is reason to think that implementation of the SBD may
result in a relatively small number of taxpayers overclaiming expenses, thus
positively influencing compliance overall.
Even if the SBD reduces tax evasion, the efficiency of such a regime
must be considered. The SBD might distort the decision between
employment and self-employment, as well as decisions about the size of
one’s business. Further, if the SBD is limited only to gig workers, it may
distort investment in the gig economy.
For gig workers (or other sole proprietors) that incur very few business
expenses, the SBD is clearly favorable because it allows them to deduct 60
percent of their receipts even if their actual deductions would be much lower.
Employed taxpayers performing similar services, on the other hand, generally
cannot deduct business expenses. The SBD would create a strong incentive, then,
for taxpayers in low-cost industries who have the option to be self-employed to
opt out of employment or to characterize employment-like relationships as
self-employment. Such a distortion could cause overinvestment in some sectors
and underinvestment in others, would result in additional revenue loss, and
could encourage noncompliance if taxpayers seek to incorrectly categorize
themselves as gig workers or as otherwise self-employed.
Notwithstanding these incentives, the magnitude of such distortions is
uncertain. First, there are already some tax advantages to self-employment,
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like the ability to deduct minor business expenses that are not deductible by
employees and, for dishonest taxpayers, greater ease in underreporting
taxable income. While the SBD would make self-employment more attractive
in some industries (those with high profit ratios), it is unclear how much this
would add to existing incentives. Further, there are many non-tax reasons that
taxpayers may prefer employment, such as job security, sick leave, paid
vacations, and health insurance and other benefits. Presumably many
individuals would prefer to retain their employment status because they
believe these benefits outweigh whatever tax benefit would be realized from
the SBD. Further, many taxpayers likely take whatever work is available to
them, and might not have the option to move back and forth between
employment and self-employment in the same industry.
In addition to potential distortions between employment and selfemployment, applying the SBD to only “small” businesses below a threshold
of receipts requires line drawing, which will also create distortions, either in
the investments made or the amount of receipts reported.221 To see why this
is so, imagine a 60 percent SBD that applies only to businesses that earn at
or below $100,000 in gross receipts. Assume that a taxpayer incurs $10,000 of
fixed costs to produce receipts somewhere in the neighborhood of $100,000.
If he has precisely $100,000 in receipts, his tax under the SBD is based on
$40,000 of net income. If he earns $100,001, his taxed is based on his true net
income of $90,001, resulting in an extremely high marginal tax rate on the
additional dollar of income.222
But although the SBD threshold would likely impact reporting behavior for
some taxpayers,223 it seems less likely that the threshold would have a significant
impact on investment decisions. Taxpayers choosing among investments at or
around the threshold level of receipts probably cannot accurately predict exactly
where their receipts would come out and, thus, it seems unlikely they would
choose one business over the other because of the SBD.
For those considering an investment well above the threshold for the
SBD, the analysis is different. When considering two alterative businesses
with high profit ratios, where one would qualify the taxpayer for the SBD
and one would not, the business that qualified for the SBD would result in a
221 The potential problem of taxpayers segregating lines of business into multiple “small” businesses
could be addressed by applying the threshold and SBD in the aggregate to each individual taxpayer.
222 One response to this cliff effect is to make the 60 percent SBD apply in all cases to the first
$100,000 of gross receipts, with the taxpayer’s actual profit ratio applying thereafter. However, this
would generate revenue loss without an offsetting reduction in compliance and enforcement costs,
because taxpayers over the threshold would still have to track business expenses and the IRS would
still have to monitor them.
223 For example, a taxpayer who earns $100,001 of receipts may simply report that he earned
$100,000 so he can claim the SBD. However, this wouldn’t be possible if all receipts were subject to
1099 reporting.
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lower effective tax rate and a higher after-tax rate of return as compared to
the one that did not qualify.224 But choosing a business that would generate
low receipts over one that would generate high receipts would only be rational
if the taxpayer could invest his remaining funds at a return that would exceed
the after-tax return on the bigger business. In the real world, it is unclear how
many small, individual business owners make decisions this way. It seems
plausible that many individuals choose the line of business they think will be
most profitable (and perhaps enjoyable), preferring a larger absolute return
even if it comes at a higher effective tax rate. Given the relative lack of
sophistication of many gig workers, it is also questionable whether the lower
effective tax rate imposed by the SBD would even enter into their calculus.
In any event, these potential efficiency costs must be weighed against the
advantages of an SBD. The costs of behavioral distortions induced by a gross
receipts cap would ideally be outweighed by the reduction in compliance and
administrative costs resulting from the SBD. In an analogous context, this
assumption underlies the small-firm exemption available in most countries
with a value added tax: firms have similar incentives to reduce reported or
actual receipts to fall below the VAT exemption threshold, yet policymakers
deem the costs outweighed by the administrative and compliance advantages
of the exemption.225
In sum, the efficiency and revenue costs of an elective SBD are uncertain,
and policymakers would be wise to undertake further study of taxpayer
responses to an SBD before implementing such a policy on a broad level.
However, there is reason to think that behavioral distortions would be
modest, that evasion would decline, and that potential revenue loss would be
offset by a vast reduction in compliance and administrative costs.
CONCLUSION
The current small business tax regime—one in which individuals are
expected to adhere to burdensome recordkeeping and filing requirements and
pay taxes on an honor system—is rife with costs. Perhaps most indicative of the
224 Consider an SBD with a $100,000 threshold as an example. A taxpayer who earns $200,000
in gross receipts with a 90 percent profit ratio would have a higher effective tax rate than a taxpayer
with the same profit ratio who earns $100,000, because the SBD would enable the latter to claim 60
percent in expenses while the first taxpayer could claim only 10 percent. Thus, the first taxpayer
would pay tax on $180,000 of net income, while the second would pay tax on $40,000 in reported
income, when actual net income is $90,000.
225 See JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE
DEBATE OVER TAXES 248 (4th ed. 2008) (“The conventional wisdom among VAT experts is that
the administrative and compliance costs savings from exempting firms with revenues below some
moderate threshold outweighs the efficiency cost of this approach. For this reason, most countries
that operate a VAT do exempt firms with turnover below a certain threshold.”).
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regime’s shortcomings is the fact that the government collects less than half of
the tax owed by individual small business owners.226 But the digitization of
commerce has given Congress the tools to vastly simplify tax compliance and
enforcement for gig workers and other types of small business owners.
While neither proposal discussed here is a panacea, implementing gross
receipts withholding along with a standard business deduction for gig workers
should reduce noncompliance and make the tax system significantly more
efficient. And while each of these proposals has merit as a standalone policy,
gross receipts withholding based on a presumed 40 percent profit ratio would
be harmonious with a standard deduction equal to 60 percent of gross receipts.
Although further study may reveal a more accurate presumed net profit
percentage, the underlying structure of the proposals would remain the same.
What’s more, these proposals represent reforms that should transcend party
lines and provide clear benefits to both the government and taxpayers alike.

226

See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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